BEYOND MODESTY:
PRIVACY IN PRISON AND THE RISK OF
SEXUAL ABUSE
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"[B]eing a woman prisoner in U.S. state prisons can be a
terrifying experience. If you are sexually abused, you cannot
escape from your abuser."'
Unsolicited sexual touching, harassment, and coercion are "simply
not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses
against society."2 Nonetheless, U.S. women's prisons have become
notorious for the severe and pervasive sexual abuse of women prisoners
by male guards that too often occurs there.3 This sexual abuse
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1. Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar: Sexual Abuse of Women in U.S. State
Prisons,(Dec. 1996), at http://www.hrw.org/summaries/s.us96d.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2005)
[hereinafter Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar].
2. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 425 U.S. 337,347 (1981)).
3. See, e.g., Amnesty International, "Not Part of My Sentence": Violation of the Human
Rights of Women in Custody, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engAMR510011999
(1999) (last visited Jan. 21, 2005) [hereinafter Amnesty International, Not Part of My
Sentence]; Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report of the Mission to the United States of America on
the Issue of Violence Against Women in State and Federal Prisons, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences, in Accordance with
Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1997/44 (1999); Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to
Hide:
Retaliation
Against
Women
in
Michigan
State
Prisons,
at
http://www.hrw.org/reports98/women/Mich.htm (1998) (last visited Jan. 21, 2005) [hereinafter
Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Hide]; Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar,supra note
1. Custodial sexual abuse of women prisoners has been described as "one of the most heinous
state-sanctioned human rights violations within the U.S. today." Angela Davis, Public
Imprisonment and Private Violence: Reflections on the Hidden Punishment of Women, 24
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 339, 351 (1998).
While sexual abuse of male prisoners also occurs, "most sexual assaults on male
prisoners are committed by fellow prisoners," and custodial sexual abuse by female guards is
far less common than custodial sexual abuse by male guards. Teresa A. Miller, Keeping the
Government's Hands Off Our Bodies: Mapping a Feminist Legal Theory Approach to Privacy
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comprises various forms of sexual assault, exploitation, and harassment.
In 1996, Human Rights Watch described the ongoing abuses in U.S.
women's prisons as follows:
[M]ale correctional employees have vaginally, anally, and orally
raped female prisoners and sexually assaulted and abused them.
We found that in the course of committing such gross
misconduct, male officers have not only used actual or
threatened physical force, but have also used their near total
authority to provide or deny goods and privileges to female
prisoners to compel them to have sex or, in other cases, to
reward them for having done so. In other cases, male officers
have violated their most basic professional duty and engaged in
sexual contact with female prisoners absent the use or threat of
force or any material exchange. In addition to engaging in sexual
relations with prisoners, male officers have used mandatory patfrisks or room searches to grope women's breasts, buttocks, and
vaginal areas and to view them inappropriately while in a state of
undress in the housing or bathroom areas. Male correctional
officers and staff have also engaged in regular verbal degradation
and harassment of female prisoners, thus contributing to a
custodial environment in the state prisons for women which is
often highly sexualized and excessively hostile.'
As various correctional departments
and human rights
organizations have observed, an important factor contributing to
custodial sexual abuse in US women's prisons is that "the United States,
despite authoritative international rules to the contrary, allows male
correctional employees to hold contact positions over prisoners."'6
In many states, "a male guard may watch over a woman, even when
she is dressing or showering or using the toilet. He may touch every
part of her body when he searches for contraband. 7 Thus, "much of the
touching and viewing of [women prisoners'] bodies by staff that women

in Cross-Gender Prison Searches, 4 BuFF. CRIM. L. REV. 861, 868 n.29 (2001) [hereinafter
Miller, Government's Hands].
4. Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar,supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., Torres v. Wisconsin, 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988); Everson v. Mich. Dep't of
Corr., 222 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
6. Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar,supra note 1; Amnesty International, Not
Partof My Sentence, supra note 3.
7. Amnesty International, Not Partof My Sentence, supra note 3; see also, e.g., Everson,
222 F. Supp. 2d 864; Carl v. Angelone, 883 F. Supp. 1433 (D. Nev. 1995).
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experience as shocking and humiliating is permitted by law."8 It is not
surprising, then, that "[t]here is a strong correlation between crossgender searches and custodial sexual misconduct [by] male guards." 9
Women's exposure to custodial sexual abuse is also racialized.
About fifty-two percent of women prisoners in the United States are
African-American.' 0
Hispanic
women
are
also
grossly
overrepresented." By contrast, seventy percent of guards in U.S. federal
prisons for women are men. 12 Most of these men are white." The
courts' failure to effectively protect women prisoners from sexual abuse
both reflects and constructs the devaluation of black women and other
women of color in the criminal justice system and illustrates the lack of
seriousness with which assaults on women of color are generally taken
by the courts. 4

An estimated forty to eighty-eight percent of women prisoners have
been sexually or physically abused by men prior to their imprisonment."
As a result, many women prisoners fear the male guards who have
absolute authority over their lives:
More than half the women in here have been sexually abused at
one time in their lives, some as small children by father, uncle,
granddad, mother's lover. They fear men, even despise men.
8. Amnesty International, Not Partof My Sentence, supra note 3.
9. Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 867.
10. Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar,supra note 1.
11. Amnesty International, Not Partof My Sentence, supra note 3.
12. Id.
13. The Georgia state director of Southern Prison Ministries "has attributed a major
part of the problem of sexual abuse to the fact that the prisons are run almost exclusively by
white men." Laderberg, infra note 15, at 340 n.108; see also Miller, Government's Hands,
supra note 3, at 886.
14. See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender and Sexual Harassment,65 S.CAL. L.
REV. 1467, 1470 (1992) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Gender].
15. Amnesty International, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 3, estimates the
percentage at 48-80%; see also Amy Laderberg, Note, The "Dirty Little Secret": Why Class
Actions Have Emerged as the Only Viable Option for Women Inmates Attempting to Satisfy
the Subjective Prong of the Eighth Amendment in Suits for Custodial Sexual Abuse, 40 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 323, 338 n.97 (1998). In Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir.
1993) (en banc), the uncontroverted expert evidence of a psychologist at a California
women's prison was that eighty-five percent of the women prisoners reported having been
sexually abused. In 1990, the American Correctional Association published a profile
indicating that the typical female prisoner was sexually abused "between the ages of five and
fourteen, usually by a male of her immediate family." Lisa Krim, A Reasonable Woman's
Version of Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Cross-Gender, Clothed-Body Searches of Women
Prisoners,6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 85, 113 (1995).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[88:751

There are hookers who hate men. There are some very young
girls in here who are afraid to function in prison without a
"protector. 16
Not only does a woman's prior history "hypersensitize" her to sexual
abuse, it also renders her more vulnerable to attacks in prison. 17 Thus a
woman's prior sexual abuse increases both her fear of sexual abuse and
the likelihood that that fear will materialize.
As Angela Davis points out, the ideological division of private and
public obscures the links between domestic abuse and abuse of women
prisoners by guards: "Domestic violence as a form of punishment is
rarely perceived as integrally connected to the modes of punishment
implemented by the State., 18 Even "as 'private' sexual and physical
assaults against women are increasingly constructed as 'crimes' and,
therefore, subject to 'public' sanctions,"' 9 she points
out, "'public'
20
imprisonment of women remains as hidden as ever.,
Women of color face a "continued pandemic of private
punishment, 21 even as the number of women of color incarcerated in
jails and prison skyrockets. Thus, Davis points out, "the lives of poor,
working-class and racially marginalized women [are] overdetermined by
punishment., 22 When courts fail to respond to violence against women,2
whether in the home or in prison, they effectively "privatize" it, '
removing it from the public realm: "[judicial] silence is permissive,
implicitly condoning
the existing violence and encouraging its
' 24
perpetuation.
At the same time, as I describe in this Article, women prisoners
deploy the "privacy" protections of the Fourth Amendment 25 to
16. JEAN HARRIS, THEY ALWAYS CALL US LADIES: STORIES FROM PRISON 116

(1988).
17. Laderberg, supra note 15, at 338.
18. Id. at 341.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 344.
22. Id.

23. Increasingly, as the operation of prisons is turned over from government to private
corporations, violence against prisoners is actually committed by private actors. The question
of the impact of the privatization of prisons on prisoners' constitutional rights and remedies,
however, is beyond the scope of this Article.
24. Zanita Fenton, Mirrored Silence: Reflections on Judicial Complicity in Private
Violence, 78 OR. L. REV. 995, 1012 (1999); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 96 (1987).

25. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
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challenge the pervasive authority of male guards over their lives. They
have used the privacy guarantee to challenge the assignment of male
guards to women prisoners' housing units, as well as to challenge prison
policies that authorize male guards to physically search them and view
them unclothed. These practices, the prisoners have argued, degrade
them, violate their personal dignity, and leave them vulnerable to sexual
assault. Their privacy challenges have met with mixed success.
In this Article, I seek to develop an approach to Fourth Amendment
privacy that places the underlying, largely inchoate concern of gender
privacy law-the risk of sexual abuse 26 -at the center of the analysis.
Only by addressing the risk of prison sexual abuse in context, I argue,
can privacy law transcend its discriminatory roots and offer genuine
protection to male and female prisoners against sexual abuse.
In Part I, I discuss the standard of Fourth Amendment review as it is
applied to prisoners, and demonstrate that, rather than protecting
prisoners' privacy and human dignity, as it purports to do, the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence effectively privatizes custodial sexual abuse
by immunizing prisons from liability for it. In prison, "privacy" serves,
as it traditionally did in the context of domestic violence, as a shield
behind which women can be abused by their keepers, without
interference by the courts.
In Part II, I discuss the critiques of prison privacy offered by
Professors Amy Kapczynski" Teresa Miller,' and Rebecca Jurado.29
These scholars demonstrate that contemporary privacy jurisprudence
serves mainly to enforce stereotypical norms of feminine modesty.
These modesty critics contend that the privacy cases stereotype
prisoners as delicate victims who need legal shelter from the male gaze,
and express great concern that privacy law not stereotype men as sexual
aggressors.
Their emphasis on the symbolic harm of gender
stereotyping leads the modesty critics to advocate a gender-neutral
interpretation of privacy in which male guards would continue to be
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
26. Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112
YALE L.J. 1257 (2003).
27. Id. at 1280.
28. Teresa Miller, Sex Surveillance: Gender, Privacy and the Sexualization of Power in
Prison, 10 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTs. L.J. 291 (2000) [hereinafter Miller, Sex Surveillance];
Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3.
29. Rebecca Jurado, The Essence of Her Womanhood: Defining the Privacy Rights of
Women Prisonersand the Employment Rights of Women Guards, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 1 (1999).
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permitted to physically search women prisoners and view them
unclothed. This solution, I contend, would continue to expose women
prisoners to custodial sexual abuse.
I argue that the modesty critics' concern about stereotyping is
misguided. I draw upon Professor MacKinnon to argue that, when
women prisoners are sexually exploited by guards, they are victims of
sexual aggression; feminists do them no favor by pretending that they
are not. Secondly, the stereotype that so greatly concerns Professors
Kapczynski, Miller, and Jurado-that of the fragile, modest woman who
has to be confined to a pedestal and protected against her own
sexuality-has never applied to the black, working-class, and criminal
women who populate U.S. prisons. The intersection of gender, race,
class, and criminality has excluded these women from this feminine
ideal. Such women have never been overprotected from sexual abuse,
and they are clearly not being adequately protected in prison. Rather,
their failure to conform to the ideal of feminine modesty exposes them
to sexual abuse by men, and informs the courts' indifference to that
abuse.
Finally, in Part III, I propose a reinterpretation of the Fourth
Amendment privacy guarantee: Rather than protecting "modesty,"
Fourth Amendment privacy should recognize a constitutional right to be
free from the fear, risk, and reality of sexual abuse in prison. ° This
approach to privacy addresses the inadequacies of privacy doctrine that
I have identify in Part I, and the criticisms of Professors Kapczynski,
Miller, and Jurado discussed in Part II. This reconceptualization of
privacy will replace stereotypical conjecture with a contextual analysis
of the evidence of risks of sexual abuse. It offers an alternative to
prisoner "modesty" that merits greater weight in the balance against
institutional priorities and the Title VII rights of guards, avoids the
gender-blind pitfalls of the modesty critique, and responds to the
gendered realities of sex and power in prison to offer equal protection to
male and female prisoners.

30. Presumably, this analysis could equally apply to nonsexual abuses in prison, but in
this Article, my analysis centers on the sexual abuse that (understandably, given the courts'
emphasis on the cross-gender aspect of privacy) has given rise to most of the prison privacy
litigation.
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I. PRISON PRIVACY IN PRACTICE

A. FourthAmendment Privacy: The Standard
"The overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the
State." 3 ' This entails not only a right to dignity and security of the
person, but also a privacy right whose dimensions have not been fully
demarcated by the courts.
In general, when faced with a claim by an individual that his or her
Fourth Amendment privacy rights have been violated, the courts apply
a two-step test: First, the court must determine whether the individual
has a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy."32
This inquiry entails both a subjective individual expectation of privacy
and an objective determination that society recognizes that expectation
as reasonable.33 Second, the court engages in a balancing analysis: The
individual expectation of privacy is balanced against the interests
asserted by the state actor.3
In Turner v. Safley,35 the Supreme Court established a special,
deferential standard of scrutiny for prisoners' constitutional claims.
Where the person claiming the privacy right is a prisoner, the level of
scrutiny is minimal: rather than enjoying the protection of strict scrutiny,
prisoners' Fourth Amendment rights can be infringed as long as the
government offers a "reasonable basis" for the infringement. Thus, any
state intrusion into prisoners' privacy is permissible as long as the
36
infringement is "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.
1. Scope of Prisoner Privacy: Defined by the Prison
37 the Supreme Court held that prisoners have
In Hudson v. Palmer,
no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to searches of their
cells and property. "Society," the majority held in Hudson, "is not
prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of

31. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
32. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
33. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
34. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989); Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527 (1983).
35. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
36. Id. at 89.
37. 468 U.S. 517 (1983).
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privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell. 3 8 Prisoners are
disallowed any constitutional privacy right with respect to their cells or
property because recognition of such a right would inconvenience the
prison administration and limit its ability to keep prisoners under
control. Justice Burger held in Hudson:
The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their individual
cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of
incarceration and the needs and objectives of penal
institutions.... [I]t would be literally impossible to accomplish
the prison objectives identified above if inmates retained a right
of privacy in their cells.... A right of privacy in traditional
Fourth Amendment terms is fundamentally incompatible with
the close and continual surveillance of inmates and their cells
required to ensure institutional security and internal order.3 9
Thus, prisoners' rights to privacy are not judicially recognized unless
those rights are consistent with the interests of the state.' Indeed, the
scope and very existence of prisoners' privacy rights are determined
from a majoritarian perspective: "[S]ociety would insist that the
prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be
considered the paramount interest in institutional security.""
Normally, the very essence of individual rights is that they conflict
with the interests of the state." As Ronald Dworkin contends, rights
serve as "political trumps held by individuals."43 Individual rights are
intended to pose obstacles and impose burdens on governmental
action." The Supreme Court's determination that prisoners' privacy
rights are limited by the interests of the state, rather than the other way
around, means that prisoners have no privacy rights at all.
The majority in Hudson held that it was not leaving prisoners
"without a remedy for calculated harassment unrelated to prison needs.
38. Id. at 526.
39. Id. at 527-28. I have found no case in which the interest of the prison in maintaining
"security" was found to encompass its duty to protect women inmates from sexual abuse. See,
e.g., Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 222 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
40. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527-28.
41. Id. at 528 (emphasis added).
42. See, e.g., LouIs HENKIN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 25-27, 44 (1999) (citing JOHN
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 135-38 (1690); JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY (1849)).
43. See HENKIN ET AL., supra note 42, at 77 (quoting Ronald Dworkin).
44. Id.
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Nor does it mean that prison attendants can ride roughshod over
inmates' property rights with impunity. 4 '
Though the Fourth
Amendment does not assist them, prisoners are said to enjoy the
protection of the Eighth Amendment against malicious searches of their
property: "The Eighth Amendment always stands as protection against
'cruel and unusual punishment."' 6
This backup remedy, however, is no remedy at all.

Amendment

has been "even

less effective"

than

The Eighth

the Fourth

Amendment for prisoner-plaintiffs challenging searches. 47 The courts'

interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, which requires subjective
"deliberate indifference" to the prisoner's treatment, is in practice so
permissive of sexual abuse (which is defined as a "condition of

confinement") ' that the Eighth Amendment jurisprudence presents an
"insurmountable obstacle" 49 to any prisoner claiming redress for such
abuse.'

For a prisoner challenging sexually abusive search or surveillance
practices, then, the only remaining Fourth Amendment issue is this:
Does a prisoner have a vestigial Fourth Amendment right of privacy
regarding guards' ability to view and touch her body, or not?
The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved this issue. 1 In Bell

v. Wolfish, 2 the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that
45. 468 U.S. at 530.
46. Id.
47. Jurado, supra note 29, at 35.
48. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994). As the Court held in Farmer,
no matter how harshly a prisoner is sexually abused, there is no constitutional violation
unless:
[Tihe [prison] official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.... But [the prison] official's failure to alleviate a significant risk that he
should have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under
our cases be condemned as the infliction of punishment.
Id.
49. Laderberg, supra note 15, at 328; see also Anthea Dinos, Custodial Sexual Abuse:
Enforcing Long-Awaited Policies Designed to Protect Female Prisoners,45 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 281, 291 (2001) ("The deliberate indifference standard under the Eighth Amendment is
too stringent to allow any reasonable opportunity to obtain relief.").
50. Laderberg argues that class actions are the only means by which a prisoner-plaintiff
has a chance to establish an Eighth Amendment violation resulting from custodial sexual
abuse: If the prisoner-plaintiff sues alone, she is sure to fail. Laderberg, supra note 15, at 352.
51. Jurado, supra note 29, at 47.
52. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
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rights upon

commitment to a corrections facility."53 The circuit courts are divided as

to whether prisoners have any privacy rights at all. 4 In the leading case,

York v. Story,55 the Ninth Circuit held that it could not "conceive of a

more basic subject of privacy than the naked body. The desire to shield
one's unclothed figure from view of strangers, and particularly strangers
of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal

dignity. 5 6 While most circuit courts have recognized a limited privacy
right of prisoners with respect to invasive cross-gender searches,57 the
Seventh Circuit has held that prisoners have no Fourth Amendment
privacy rights whatsoever. 8
Finally, if prisoners retain some privacy right in respect of their
bodies, its content is minimal.

9

In Bell, the Supreme Court found that a

prison policy subjecting prisoners to visual searches of their body
cavities without probable cause did not violate any Fourth Amendment
privacy right prisoners or detainees might enjoy.'
If the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is, as the Supreme Court
held in Schmerber v. California,6 the protection of "personal privacy

53. Id. at 558.
54. The Supreme Court has declined to grant certiorari at least four times regarding the
constitutionality of cross-gender search or surveillance. Jennifer Weiser, The Fourth
Amendment Right of Female Inmates to be Free from Cross-Gender Pat-Frisks,33 SETON
HALL L. REv. 31, 41 n.67 (2002).
55. 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963).
56. Id. at 455 (containing a Fourteenth Amendment due process challenge by a female
assault victim who was required by the defendant-officers to pose in indecent positions, after
which the photographs were distributed among police officers). But see Grummet v. Rushen,
779 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1985) (containing a prisoner as a complainant who was
distinguished from the York v. Story complainant as a victim of crime).
57. See, e.g., Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736 (5th Cir. 2002); Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d
1109 (9th Cir. 1998); Fortner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024 (11th Cir. 1993); Covino v. Patrissi, 967
F.2d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1992); Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1992); Michenfelder v.
Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988); Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164 (1st Cir. 1986).
58. Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 146 (7th Cir. 1995).
59. Weiser, supra note 54, at 39; Forts v. Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
60. Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. The gender of the prisoners whose body cavities were being
searched, and of the guards conducting the searches, was not mentioned in Bell. Id.; see also
Weiser, supra note 54, at 41 n.66 (citing the following cases: Covino, 967 F.2d 73; Elliott v.
Lynn, 38 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1994); Peckham v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 141 F.3d 694 (7th Cir.
1988); Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694 (9th Cir. 1997); Harris v. Rocchio, 132 F.3d 42 (10th
Cir. 1997)). In dissent, Justice Marshall argued that "body-cavity searches ...represent one
of the most grievous offenses against personal dignity and common decency." Bell, 441 U.S.
at 576-77 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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and
against
intrusion
that dignity
protection
moreunwarranted
than prisoners
do. 3 by the State,

62

no one needs

2. Standard of Review

If the prisoner succeeds in establishing a cognizable privacy interest
that is infringed by the prison practice, she must also establish that the
intrusion was not "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." 6'
In this analysis, every government intrusion into a
prisoner's privacy will be found constitutional, as long as the
government offers a "legitimate and neutral" reason for the regulation,
and there is a "valid, rational connection" between the restriction and
the governmental objective. 6' A restriction on prisoner privacy does
66 not

violate the Fourth Amendment unless it is "arbitrary or irrational."
In Turner, the Court identified two other factors with respect to the
"reasonableness" criterion. First, where "there are alternative means"

for the prisoner to exercise the right, courts should be particularly

deferential to the prison administration. 6 The government need not
justify the means it has chosen to restrict the prisoner's constitutional
rights, as it would have to do with a free person;'

it need only

demonstrate that the prisoner could exercise her right to privacy in
some other way.69
62. Id. at 767.
63. As Catharine MacKinnon has argued, "The least privileged women, not the most,
[are and should be the] center and foundation of feminist theory." Catharine MacKinnon,
Keeping it Real: On Anti-Essentialism, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS AND A NEW CRITICAL
RACE THEORY (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2000); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971). The second of Rawls' two principles of justice is, in part, that social and
economic inequalities "must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of
society." Id.
64. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 90.
67. Id.
68. The prison administration need not choose the least restrictive alternative for
achieving its objectives. Rather, the onus is on the prisoner to prove the existence of "an
alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid
penological interests." Id. at 91; see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 n.40 (1979);
Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 145 (7th Cir. 1995). If this is proven, the court "may"-but
need not-"consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable
relationship standard." Id.
69. It seems clear that the government could point to some other part of the prisoner's
privacy right that had not been restricted. For example, if the impugned policy invades the
prisoner's privacy by mandating cross-gender clothed searches, the government could argue
that the prisoner can nonetheless "exercise" her privacy right by not being subjected to, say, a
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Finally, if accommodation of the prisoner's Fourth Amendment
privacy right would likely affect fellow prisoners, guards or "the
allocation of prison resources generally," the prison administration is
entitled to judicial deference. 0
The "reasonableness" standard of review was expressly designed to
make the jobs of prison administrators easier (as well as to relieve the
courts of the anticipated flood of prisoners' rights litigation that would
otherwise be expected to result). 71 As Justice O'Connor held in Turner:
[S]uch a standard is necessary if "prison administrators..., and
not the courts, are to make the difficult judgments concerning
institutional operations." Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of
prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would
seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and
to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of
prison administration.
The rule would also distort the
decisionmaking process, for every administrative judgment
would be subject to the possibility that some court somewhere
would conclude that it had a less restrictive way of solving the
problem at hand.72
It is hardly surprising that, in "[b]alancing the state's 'need for the
particular search' against the extent of the invasion suffered by the
inmate, courts have generally found that the institutional concerns of
the prison outweigh the intrusiveness of the searches." 73 In the words of
Judge Easterbrook in Johnson v. Phelan: "[T]he animating theme of the
Court's prison jurisprudence for the last 20 years [has been] the
requirement that judges respect hard choices made by prison
administrators."74 The judgments of prison officials as to the treatment
of prisoners are, from a constitutional point of view, "all but
dispositive."75
cross-gender strip search.
70. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987); see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 547.
71. Judicial and legislative apprehension about a deluge of frivolous prisoner litigation is
unfounded: Prisoners are no more litigious per capita than other Americans. James
Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A "Not Exactly,"
Equal ProtectionAnalysis, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 105, 142 (2000); Margot Schlanger, Inmate
Litigation,116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1573 (2003).
72. Turner,482 U.S. at 89.
73. Weiser, supra note 54, at 34 (citation omitted).
74. Johnson, 69 F.3d at 145.
75. Miller, Government's Hands,supra note 3, at 883.
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Guards' sexual harassment and exploitation of prisoners, then, are
practically unreviewable under the Fourth Amendment.76 When the
courts refuse to prohibit abusive behavior, their silence amounts to an
"abdication of judicial responsibility that permits delegation to a nonlegitimate actor."" This uncritical judicial deference, which abandons
prisoners' well-being almost entirely to the discretion of guards and
wardens, effectively privatizes the abuse of prisoners: prisoners, and
their treatment, have been removed from the public realm. "Like the
patriarchal authority of the husband within the traditionally ordered
home, the 78authority of prison administrators within the prison cannot be
gainsaid.
Thus, Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine inverts the prisoner's
right to privacy: It becomes a private right of prison79 officials, within very
broad parameters, to treat prisoners as they see fit.
B. Privacy in Practice:Cross-Gender Search and Surveillance
As many international and domestic observers have pointed out,'
76. This is even more true of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, but that issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
77. Fenton, supra note 24, at 1041.
78. Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 883. Miller argues:
Within the private sphere of home and family, patriarchal power is magnified by
virtue of women's exclusion from the public sphere, and, [sic] women's power is
diminished by their resulting dependence on men. As a consequence, extreme
abuses of power within the home- such as domestic violence and spousal rape-go
unnoticed by society. Thus privacy functions as a veneer that obscures the sexual
oppression of women by protecting and simultaneously disempowering them in an
isolated sphere. Likewise prisons-although they are quintessentially public
institutions-exist within a separate, "closed" sphere of discipline and punishment.
Id. at 882.
79. The banishment of black women and women of color to prisons where they are
subjected to sexual abuse, forced labor, and the appropriation of their children, all under
color of lawful authority, evokes black women's historical experiences as slaves. See, e.g.,
Davis, supra note 3, at 350 ("Since the population of women in prison is now comprised of a
majority of women of color, the historical resonances of slavery, colonization and genocide
should not be missed in these images of women in chains and shackles.").
80. See supra notes 3, 6-9, and accompanying text. Amy Laderberg observes:
The lack of privacy inherent in a prison environment necessarily means that women
are exposed and vulnerable on a twenty-four-hour basis. While in prison, women
inmates "are in a position where sexual harassment behaviors can take place with
relative impunity." Jails are not constructed with the privacy of inmates as a major
concern. Male guards may observe prisoners undressed in their cells, showers,
toilets or during searches by jail matrons. "Some officers apparently seek out
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the courts' refusal to recognize meaningful privacy rights for prisoners
exposes women prisoners to the constant risk of sexual abuse. Guards
exercise absolute authority over women prisoners.81 In many women's
prisons, male guards conduct surveillance of women prisoners while
they are unclothed and perform what are euphemistically8 2 described as
"pat-frisks," which virtually invite sexual harassment and abuse. For
example, in Washington federal prisons, the authorized method in which
a male guard is to conduct a pat-frisk of a woman prisoner is to "run his
hands over [the prisoner's] clothed body starting with her neck and
working down to her feet," using "a flat hand and pushing motion across
the inmate's crotch area." When searching the woman's crotch and
upper thighs, the guard is to "push inward and upward," "squeez[ing]"
and "knead[ing]" all seams in the leg and crotch area. The guard is to
use the back of his hands
in a "sweeping motion" to "flatten[ ]" the
83
breasts of the prisoner.
Obviously, women prisoners experience touching of their breasts or
genital area by a male guard as a sexual invasion. ' As Judge Reinhardt
noted in a concurring opinion in Jordan v. Gardner,5 "[s]uch conduct is
offensive in the extreme to all women, regardless of their prior sexual
history. ""
Were a man to touch a woman in this manner without consent
outside the prison context, such touching would amount to a sexual
assault. Such touching of prisoners by male guards is inherently
sexualized, regardless of the intent of the guard.
As MacKinnon argues, "the social relation between the sexes is
organized so that men may dominate and women must submit and this
opportunities to observe females in various degrees of undress." After a while, the
constant exposure of women's bodies and the sexual relations between inmates and
staff become accepted occurrences. "You get the impression from the prison
staff... that it was a sexual smorgasbord and they could pick and choose whom they
wanted."
Laderberg, supra note 15, at 342.
81. See generally, e.g., KATHRYN WATTERSON BURKHART, WOMEN IN PRISON (1973);
HARRIS, supra note 16; ANDI RIERDEN, THE FARM: LIFE INSIDE A WOMEN'S PRISON

(1997).
82. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1523 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (rejecting the
prison's euphemistic description of male guards' invasive physical of women prisoners as
"pat-down" searches).
83. Jordan,986 F.2d at 1523 (quoting Washington Corrections Center for Women, PatDown Searches of Female Inmates manual).
84, Weiser, supra note 54, at 32 n.5.
85. 986 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1993).
86. Id. at 1540.
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relation is sexual-in fact, is sex." 7 This observation is particularly true
for women in prison, whose prior relationships with men have generally
been abusive, and who are now subject to the unquestionable authority
of male guards. These women can experience "revictimization, anxiety,
depression, and possibly increased suicide attempts" as a result of crossgender physical searches, which impose "almost an unendurable
psychological threat and stress." 88 In Jordan, a woman prisoner who
reported a lengthy history of sexual abuse was so traumatized by such a
search conducted by a male guard that "she had to have her fingers
pried loose from bars she had grabbed during the search, and she
vomited after returning to her cell block. 89 As Jennifer Weiser
contends, prisoners are likely to fear sexual assault when they are
subjected to such intrusive physical searches by male guards. 9°
"Furthermore, there is a substantially lesser threat of other females
making inappropriate sexual contact, verbalizations, or intimidation."' 91
Thus, as Judge Reinhardt pointed out in Jordan,the consequences of
such searches go beyond moral offense: "[I]nvasive searches of the
bodies of female prisoners by male prison guards are harmful both
because they constitute and reinforce gender subordination, and
because they offend our basic values and our concepts of human
dignity. '
International norms that govern the treatment of prisoners provide
that women prisoners should be "attended and supervised" by women
guards only93 and that body searches be "carried out in a manner
87. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989)
[hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE]. In Everson v. Mich. Dep't of
Corr., 222 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002), two experts apparently testified as to the
"normalizing effect" on imprisoned women of "cross-gender supervision." Id. at 881. There
is nothing normal about life in prison. This evidence could make sense only if women's
subjection to the absolute authority of men were considered "normal."
88. Jordan,986 F.2d at 1540 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (summarizing expert evidence).
89. Id. at 1523.
90. Weiser, supra note 54, at 32.
91. Id. at 32 n.5.
92. Jordan, 986 F.2d at 1540.
93. First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, StandardMinimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,at http://www.ohchr.org/
english/law/treatmentprisoners.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2005). These rules provide that:
(1) In an institution for both men and women, the part of the institution set aside
for women shall be under the authority of a responsible woman officer who shall
have the custody of the keys of all that part of the institution.
(2) No male member of the staff shall enter the part of the institution set aside for
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consistent with the dignity of the person who is being searched" 9 by a
guard or health care worker of the same sex. 9 Nonetheless, because the

courts' Fourth Amendment analysis has generally favored prisons'
institutional security concerns and guards' equal employment rights 96 at
the expense of prisoners' rights to be free from sexual abuse, U.S. courts
have condoned, tolerated, and even required the employment of men to

guard women prisoners. 7 Thus, guards' "employment rights define
prisoners' expectations of privacy."98

Fourth Amendment challenges brought by male inmates to physical
searches by female guards have generally been rejected. The rights of
male prisoners to "privacy" are given much less weight than is given to
prison security concerns or to female guards' rights to equality in
employment."
In only one case, Dothardv. Rawlinson,'" has the complete exclusion

women unless accompanied by a woman officer.
(3) Women prisonersshall be attended and supervised only by women officers. This
does not, however, preclude male members of the staff, particularly doctors and
teachers, from carrying out their professional duties in institutions or parts of
institutions set aside for women.
Id. (emphasis added).
94. Eur. H.R. Comm., General Comment 16: The right to respect of privacy, family,
home and correspondence, and protection of honour and reputation, Article 17, T 8 (1988), at
http://www.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/hrc/comments.htm. (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
95. Id. ("Persons being subjected to body search by State officials, or medical personnel
acting at the request of the State, should only be examined by persons of the same sex.").
96. In other words, the Title VII right of corrections officers to guard prisoners of the
opposite gender, with or without restrictions as to their job responsibilities in relation to
prisoners.
97. See, e.g., U.S. v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114 (4th Cir. 1987); Everson v. Mich. Dep't of
Corr., 222 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
98. Jurado, supra note 29, at 30.
99. See, e.g., Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 334 (9th Cir. 1988) (infrequent and
casual observation "not so degrading as to warrant court interference"); Grummett v.
Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985) (searches performed "professionally" while prisoners
fully clothed); Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1100 n.10 (8th Cir. 1990); Madyun v. Franzen,
704 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1983) (no requirement of "deliberate examination" of genital area);
Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982) (prisoners' privacy interests adequately
protected by excluding genital area from search); Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Or.
1983); see also Jurado, supranote 29, at 30.
As Kapczynski points out, supra note 26, at 1266 n.52, courts were somewhat more
willing to restrict search and surveillance of unclothed male prisoners by female guards in the
earlier cases. See, e.g., Bowling v. Enomoto, 514 F. Supp. 201, 204 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Hudson
v. Goodlander, 494 F. Supp. 890, 893 (D. Md. 1980); Iowa Dep't of Soc. Servs., Iowa Men's
Reformatory v. Iowa Merit Employment Dep't, 261 N.W.2d 161,165 (Iowa 1977).
100. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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of female guards from a men's prison 1'o been upheld by a court. The
exclusion of women was found to constitute a bona fide occupational
qualification ("BFOQ") because the Supreme Court was prepared to
assume, in the absence of evidence, that women guards were likely to be
assaulted by "sex offenders who have criminally assaulted women in the
past" or by "other inmates, deprived of a normal heterosexual
environment."' ' As Jurado points out, the Court ignored the imbalance
of power between guards and prisoners, replacing reality with an "image
1 3 The
of female guards as vulnerable and male prisoners as powerful.""
Court described conditions in the Alabama prison as "characterized by
'rampant violence' and a 'jungle atmosphere,'
[that are]
constitutionally intolerable."' 4
The racial overtones of this language speak for themselves. Given
that the Dothardprison was in Alabama, one might expect that a high
proportion of the prisoners would have been imagined as black. It is
possible that stereotypes about the supposed propensity of black men to
rape may have filled in for the missing evidence of any substantial risk
that prisoners would rape female guards.
In any case, in Dothard, the "employer's well-founded concern
about the risk of sexual assault against a female [was] allowed to limit
women's employment opportunities,"'' 5 while no obligation was
imposed on the employer to "decrease or eliminate the source of the
risk of sexual assault."' '
While some courts have found a limited Fourth Amendment privacy
right of prisoners to shield their naked bodies and genitals from the
opposite sex,' ° "[w]hen male prisoners have asserted their right to
bodily privacy, the rights of male prisoners have lost to the employment
rights of female guards."'"
Dothard has been distinguished by
101. In Dothard, the exclusion of female guards from the men's prison was achieved
through height and weight requirements, which were upheld as a BFOQ. Id.
102. Id. at 335.
103. Jurado, supra note 29, at 29.
104. Dothard,433 U.S. at 335.
105. Jurado, supra note 29, at 25-26.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Forner v. Thomas, 983 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir. 1993); Hill v. McKinley,
311 F.3d 899, 903-04 (8th Cir. 2002); Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1992);
Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 1992); see also York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450,
455 (9th Cir. 1963).
108. Jurado, supra note 29, at 39; Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1266; see Gunther v.
Iowa State Men's Reformatory, 462 F. Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979), affd 612 F.2d 1079 (8th
Cir. 1980); Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 654 F. Supp 690 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Timm v.
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subsequent courts as restricted to its facts based on the intolerable
conditions in that prison. 1
In the Fourth Amendment privacy cases, courts often characterize
prisoners' privacy interests as claims to modesty or "decency," both of

which are traditionally linked to norms of women's sexual morality. " ° It
is not surprising, then, that women prisoners' privacy interests against
being viewed naked or physically searched by male guards have typically
weighed more heavily than men's in the balance against guards' Title
VII rights to equal employment.11' In Jordan, for example, the Ninth
Circuit, sitting en banc, found cognizable Eighth Amendment harm
when male guards were permitted to conduct clothed body searches of
women prisoners; in a concurring opinion, Judge Reinhardt held that
the cross-gender searches violated the prisoners' Fourth Amendment
"right of privacy and dignity in their persons."' 1 2 The evidence in Jordan
emphasized the psychological pain and trauma that cross-gender

searches caused to women prisoners, eighty-five percent of whom
reported having been sexually abused. The reasons advanced by the
prison-staff morale and a desire to keep searches unpredictable-were

found to be insubstantial in comparison with the severe harm inflicted
on to women prisoners. 3
In Forts v. Ward,"' women prisoners sought to enjoin the assignment

of male guards to duties in the housing units of the prison on the basis
that such assignments would violate their privacy.' 5 The prisoners'
privacy rights were outweighed by male guards' Title VII rights to

Gunter, 917 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1990); Grummett v. Rushen, 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985);
Smith v. Fairman, 678 F.2d 52 (7th Cir. 1982); Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Or.
1993); Johnson v. Pennsylvania Bureau of Corr., 661 F. Supp. 415 (W.D. Pa. 1987); Johnson v.
Phelan, 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995). But see cases cited supra note 99.
109. Edwards v. Dep't of Corr., 615 F. Supp. 804 (M.D. Ala. 1985); Griffin v. Michigan
Dep't of Corr., 654 F. Supp 690, 700-01 (E.D. Mich. 1982); Gunther, 462 F. Supp. 952.
110. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 577 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Johnson
v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 148 (7th Cir. 1995) (characterizing male prisoners' claim against being
viewed unclothed by female guards as a "clash between modesty and equal employment
opportunities" equivalent in gravity to male athletes' objection to female reporters entering
the locker room after a game); Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988); Everson
v. Michigan, 222 F. Supp.2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Galvan v. Carothers, 855 F. Supp. 285 (D.
Alaska 1994); Forts v. Ward, 521 F.2d 1210 (N.Y. App. 1980).
111. See, e.g., York, 324 F.2d at 452; Forts, 621 F.2d at 1215; Covino, 967 F.2d at 78;
Galvan, 855 F. Supp. at 292.
112. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1534 & n.7 (9th Cir. 1993).
113. Id. at 1535-36.
114. 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1980).
115. Id. at 1212-13.
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equality in employment, although the court proposed accommodations
such that male guards would not likely see the women prisoners
naked." 6
Female-only guard policies are more often upheld when they are
proposed by the prison, rather than by the prisoner."7 In Torres v.
Wisconsin," 8 for example, the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld a
prison policy requiring that only female guards be assigned to the living
units of the women's prison." 9 Rather than asking whether a man would
be unable to do the job, the Seventh Circuit considered "whether, given
the reasonable objectives of the employer, the very womanhood or very
manhood of the employee undermines his or her capacity to perform a
job satisfactorily."'2 The Seventh Circuit held that, although neither
prison security nor inmate "privacy" sufficed to legitimize the womenonly guard policy as a BFOQ, the prison's goal of "inmate
rehabilitation" did constitute an employer objective sufficient to
outweigh the guards' equality rights. 2' In the absence of any evidence in
support of or against the prison administrator's theory of rehabilitation,
the court deferred to the administrator's judgment that, because sixty
percent of the women prisoners had been physically or sexually abused
by men, "a living environment free of the presence of males in a position
of authority was necessary to foster the goal of rehabilitation."' 22
More recently, in Robino v. Iranon,'3 the Ninth Circuit upheld a
women-only policy for six out of forty-one guard positions at a women's

116. See id. at 1217.
117. See Reed v. County of Casey, 184 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 1999) (reassignment of female
guard to night shift justified as BFOQ to comply with Kentucky Department of Corrections
policy that female jailer had to be present when woman kept in prison); Tharp v. Iowa
Department of Corr., 68 F.3d 223 (8th Cir 1995) (upholding prison's shift assignment policy
reserving four out of 16 shifts for women guards only, so that only female guards would do
"face-to-face urinalysis" for women prisoners); Torres v. Wisconsin, 859 F.2d 1523, 1533 (7th
Cir. 1988).
118. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1523.
119. Implementation of this policy required that two male officers be demoted to lowerranked positions with no loss of pay. Id. at 1525.
120. Id. at 1528.
121. Jurado argues that the Torres court departed from the jurisprudence adopted in
male prisoners' challenges to opposite-gender search and surveillance by relying on "the
premise that modesty for women, even those in prison, must prevail.... [Tihe court knows
what society will tolerate regarding acceptable cross-gender behavior." Jurado, supra note
29, at 46. However, the court's rationale rested explicitly on rehabilitation of abused women
prisoners, not on their "modesty." Torres, 859 F.2d at 1530.
122. Id.
123. 145 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1998).
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prison. The women-only positions required the guard to "observe the
inmates in the showers and toilet areas" or have "unsupervised access to
the inmates."'2 4 The Court held that the policy constituted a "de
minimis" restriction which did not warrant a BFOQ inquiry.' 21 It further
held, in the alternative, that the legitimate penological interests
advanced by the state to justify the policy-"to protect female inmates
and to prevent allegations of sexual misconduct"126 --"outweigh[ed]
whatever interest the male ACOs may have" in assignment to the six
positions. The policy was found to constitute a "reasonable response to
concerns, 127 about inmate privacy and allegations of abuse by male
ACOs.

In Women Prisoners of the District of Columbia Department of
Corrections v. District of Columbia,' a class action challenging the

pervasive sexual abuse of women prisoners as well as various inhumane
and discriminatory conditions of confinement, the trial judge, Judge
Green, found that the severe and pervasive sexual assault, coercion,
harassment, and abuse at the prison violated the Eighth Amendment
(for convicted prisoners) and the Fifth Amendment due process
guarantee (for pretrial detainees).129 The "vulgar sexual remarks of
prison officers,"' the lack of privacy within women's cells (the cells
were visible to male prisoners and guards), and the "refusal of some
male guards to announce their presence in the living areas of women
prisoners" constituted an independent violation of the Eighth
Amendment. 3 ' Judge Green declined to determine whether the
custodial sexual harassment constituted a violation of women inmates'
Fourth Amendment privacy rights. "2
Thus, it seems that the claims of women prisoners to be free from
124. Id. at 1111.
125. Id.at 1110.
126. Id.
127. Id.at 1111.
128. Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp.
634, 665 (D.D.C. 1994), vacated in part, modified in part 899 F. Supp. 649 (D.D.C. 1995),
remanded by 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1196 (1997).
129. Id. at 665 ("The physical assaults endured by women prisoners at the [D.C. facilities
included]... [r]ape, coerced sodomy, unsolicited touching of women prisoners' vaginas,
breasts and buttocks by prison employees ....)
130. Id. These "vulgar remarks" included comments on the women's breasts and
buttocks and sexual threats such as, "[w]ell, you go ahead and do that and I'll be in there and
stick my rod up in you." Id. at 640.
131. Id. at 665.
132. Id. at 665 n.39.
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search and surveillance that expose them to sexual abuse and
harassment are most likely to succeed when the women are portrayed as
victims of current or prior sexual abuse.
However, even this
characterization is not always successful in protecting women from the
risk of sexual abuse by male guards. In a recent decision, Everson v.
33 the district court invalidated a
Michigan Department of Corrections,'
women-only guard policy that had been adopted in response to the
severe, ongoing problems of custodial sexual abuse at Michigan prisons
for women.1 4 Until the adoption of the policy in 2000, sixty percent of
guards at Michigan women's prisons had been men.
Michigan's refusal to do anything about the widespread, notorious
custodial sexual abuse in its women's prisons finally led the federal
government to sue Michigan,'36 alleging that women prisoners in
Michigan were "subject to sexual misconduct, sexual harassment,
overfamiliarity and invasion of privacy" by male guards.
The trial judge distinguished Dothard on the basis that "in Dothard,
the Supreme Court was considering a brutal, jungle-like, maximum
security environment in Alabama.', 3 8 For women prisoners in Michigan,
though, their wholesale subjection to sexual assault, abuse, harassment,
and coercion by the male guards of the Michigan Department of
Corrections may have seemed equally brutal, violent, lawless, and
constitutionally intolerable. The severity and extent of the custodial
sexual abuse problem in Michigan, "9 and the state's persistent refusal to
remedy it, could have been argued to match or exceed the exceptional
facts of 4 Dothard, and therefore to have justified the exclusion of male
guards.' 0
The settlement of the Michigan women prisoners' lawsuit regarding

133. 222 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
134. See Amnesty International, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 3; Human Rights
Watch, All Too Familiar,supra note 1; Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Hide, supra note 3;
Coomaraswamy, supra note 3.
135. Everson, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 888.
136. United States' Memorandum In Support of Stipulation to Dismiss (March 7,2000)
(No. 97-CV-71514-DT).
137. Everson, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 877.
138. Id. at 889 n.33 (quoting Griffin v. Michigan Dep't of Corr., 654 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.
Mich. 1982).
139. See Amnesty International, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 3; Human Rights
Watch, All Too Familiar,supra note 1; Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Hide, supra note 3.
140. See Intervening Defendant-Appellants' Proof Brief on Appeal at 55, Everson (No.
02-2028, 02-2033, 02-2084).
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custodial sexual abuse and harassment.. required that the Michigan
Department of Corrections ("MDOC") make a good faith effort to limit
the assignment of staff on women's housing units to women officers."2
The policy challenged in Everson had required that all guards on the
female housing units be women. MDOC sought to transfer female
guards into the prison and male guards out.' 3 The guards brought a
Title VII challenge to this rule."
At trial, Judge Cohn held that Michigan had failed to establish a
BFOQ. In defense of its women-only policy, Michigan had offered the
following penological reasons for the infringement of the guards' Title
VII rights, as summarized by the judge:
[S]ame sex supervision would enhance the privacy of female
prisoners, reduce the likelihood of sexual misconduct, the
reduction of fear of sexual misconduct will enhance the ability of
the Department to achieve its mission, security capabilities
would be improved due to much less reluctance by female staff
to perform observation duties, and female staff only in housing
units would reduce the likelihood of instances where individual
male staff and individual female prisoners would be involved in
long isolated contacts. 45
Evidence at trial was "largely devoted to the benefits and burdens to
female prison operations of limiting full-time housing officers in a
female prison to females in light of the potential for sexual assault,
sexual harassment, and overfamiliarization when male corrections
officers have custodial responsibility in the housing units.', 4 6 Indeed, the
uncontroverted evidence of the director of MDOC was that, despite
policies adopted in 1999 to reduce the incidence of sexual abuse, "sexual
misconduct and allegations of sexual misconduct had not ended and
removal of males from the female housing unit was necessary to bring
the level of misconduct as low as possible., 14 7 Rejecting the deference to
prison administrators mandated by Supreme Court and appellate

141. Nunn v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 22970 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
142. Everson, 222 F. Supp. 2d at 872.
143. Id.

144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 884.
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jurisprudence,148 Judge Cohn drew an adverse inference from the prison
director's refusal to answer a question regarding privileged legal advice
he may have received,149 and supplanted the prison director's
judgment-that a female-only guard policy was necessary in the
circumstances-with his own opinion that it was illegal.
Despite considerable evidence of the continuing risk and reality of
sexual abuse by guards in Michigan prisons, Judge Cohn characterized
the women prisoners' Fourth Amendment interest, which had to be
balanced against guards' Title VII rights, as a mere "right to be
protected against unwarranted intrusion by male corrections officers."'' °
Thus, the rights the prisoners (and prison) had asserted-freedom from
sexual assault and the fear of it-were transformed, by the trial judge's
slight of hand, into a minimal privacy right ensuring merely that male
guards could not strip search them. Not surprisingly, the guards' equal
employment rights were found to outweigh this minimal privacy
interest.
Thus, even when an attempt is made to emphasize the vulnerability
of women prisoners to sexual abuse by guards, their safety will not
always outweigh male guards' rights to guard them. In Everson,
although the MDOC, and the prisoners who intervened in the case, had
emphasized the importance of protecting the women prisoners from
sexual abuse, the nature of the prisoners' interest was downgraded to a
form of privacy akin to modesty and accorded minimal weight.'
II. PRIVACY AS MODESTY: THE CRITIQUE
A. Privacy As Stereotyping: The Modesty Critique
Professors Miller, 52 Jurado,'53 and Kapczynski"' (collectively, the

148. Id. at 890-91; see also id. at 897 ("[The Director] had no qualifications from past
training[,] employment or experience to make a reasoned judgment on the subject [of
staffing] and his leaving corrections as a profession simply confirms this.").
149. Id. at 884-85, 885 n.31.
150. Id. at 893. Judge Cohn is not without shameless contradiction on this subject.
Compare id. at 896 ("Females being viewed by males is qualitatively different than males
being viewed by females."), with id. at 898 n.37 ("To have one policy in male prisons and
another in female prisons regarding cross-gender supervision suggests stereotyping beyond
the confines of prison operation policies.").
151. Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 222 F. Supp. 2d 864 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
152. Miller, Sex Surveillance,supra note 28.
153. Jurado, supra note 29.
154. Kapczynski, supra note 26.
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"modesty critics") have offered a useful but, I contend, inadequate
critique of the discriminatory effects of constitutional privacy in prison.
In this Part, I respond to their critique, using an intersectional approach
to highlight its insights and illuminate its limitations.
1. Stereotyping of Women as Victims
The main insight of the modesty critique is that, in prison, privacy
has been interpreted as a form of feminine modesty that stereotypes
women as sexual victims and men as sexual aggressors. While this
allegation is accurate, as far as it goes, it neglects the reality that
custodial sexual abuse is a severe and widespread problem in U.S.
women's prisons. The victims of this abuse are women, and the
perpetrators are men. An adequate response to the shortcomings of
privacy law must take this reality into account.
As Miller observes, "[gendered] stereotypes are almost all that
remain of privacy in prison. When these stereotypes are exploded, there
is little left with which to protect incarcerated women from sexualized
abuse of power. ,155
The harm of privacy doctrine, as the modesty critics describe it, is
primarily symbolic. Kapczynski, for example, contends that privacy
doctrine "create[s] a world of gender meanings that have real and
discriminatory effects,' 5 6 creating legal subjects who "are defined by an
essentialized bodily modesty, one that is gendered female. They also
imagine women as constitutively vulnerable to sexualized assault (again,
from lower-class men-but not from women, or men higher up on the
professionalism scale) and as unable to protect themselves."1"' These
argues, "tend[ ] to propertize women and deny
stereotypes, Kapczynski
1 8
them sexual agency. 1
As Kapczynski points out, same-sex privacy caters to the very
"prejudices that generate gendered stratification and hierarchy in the
work force in the first place."159 Essentially, Kapczynski argues, the law
of privacy protects the "psychic safety" 16° of middle-class women from
perceived threats from men of the lower orders:

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 870.
Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1287.
Id.
Id. at 1261-62.
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1274.
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The presumption is, of course, that women do not mind male
doctors but they do mind male nurses-just as courts like the one
in Fesel insist that men do not mind female nurses. But this is
plainly less a judgment about "privacy" than about the
comparative likelihood of those lower down in status hierarchies
to be professional with, and respectful of, clients."'
These prejudices also inform the very limited scope that judges allow
for privacy claims in prison. Prison is the only context in which judges
often reject gender as a BFOQ, and is the only context in which the
courts "invert[ ] the usual tendency to value privacy over employment
rights.' 62 Thus, "'[c]ourts have been more solicitous of the privacy
interests of white collar men who fear that a cleaning woman might
knock on their bathroom door than of the privacy interests of women
and men incarcerated in prisons that are
63 often the site of severe
violations of physical and sexual integrity.'
The modesty critics urge the abandonment of "gendered
stereotypes" that women are vulnerable to sexual abuse by male guards,
and that male guards might be sexual aggressors. In spite of all the
modesty critics' recognition that it is common for male guards to
sexually abuse women in prison,' 64 in skeptical quotation marks, Miller
dismisses the gender "stereotype" that sexual "'vulnerabilities' [are]
associated with gender socialization."' 65 By dismissing women prisoners'
real exposure to sexual abuse as quote-vulnerability-unquote or as
"gendered stereotype," the modesty critics fall into the same error for
rather than
which - Miller criticizes the courts: they "idealize,
66
contextualize, the experiences of incarcerated women."'
Like Miller, Jurado laments "the courts' reliance on the fact that
women are the victims of rape, as well as its reliance on the societal
notion that any touching of a woman is sexual misconduct," which she
describes as "disheartening bases upon which to establish a greater

161. Id. at 1286 (emphasis omitted).
162. Id. at 1266 n.52.
163. Id. at 1286.
164. Id. at 1288-90; Miller, Sex Surveillance, supra note 28, at 295, 338. Jurado, by
contrast, cites Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiarin a footnote. Jurado, supra note 29, at
7 n.23, and so must be aware of the reality of custodial sexual abuse in U.S. women's prisons
but does not acknowledge this risk in her argument.
165. Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 866.
166. Id. at 873.
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expectation of privacy in women.' 67 She objects to the "stereotypical"
notion that "in their essence women are to be protected from all
possibilities of sexual assault because they are powerless and subject to
the authority of men."' 68
In response, Weiser's quote from MacKinnon is apposite: "'I am
merely telling it as it is."' 169 "Perpetrators of sexual abuse against
females are almost exclusively male.,

170

"Disheartening" though it may

be, the reality of the continuing abuse of women prisoners cannot be
theorized away. As Miller acknowledges,

The power disparity that exists between men and women in
society is magnified within the rigidly hierarchical and closed

prison apparatus. Power is sexualized in prison. Because prison
guards exercise near total authority over prisoners, the potential
for male guards to abuse their legitimate access to women's
bodies to conduct bodily searches of women and to visually

monitor them nude or only partially dressed in ways that are
overtly sexual is great.
When women prisoners are being sexually abused by guards, they
are "powerless and subject to the authority of men.' ' 72 They are
certainly not, as Jurado suggests, "protected from all possibilities of
sexual assault." Rather than being protected from sexual abuse, women

prisoners173 continue to be exposed to it without hope of relief or
redress.

74

Women

MACKINNON,

FEMINISM

When prisoners report the abuse, they face retaliation.
167. Jurado, supra note 29, at 6.
168. Id. at 52.
169. Weiser, supra note 54, at 63 (quoting CATHARINE A.
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 220 (1997)).

170. Id. at 32 n.5.
171. Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 867-68.
172. Laderberg argues that this power disparity renders custodial sexual abuse
analogous to child sexual abuse. "A bigger and more powerful person used his/her strength
or authority over a smaller, weaker and more vulnerable individual," and the victim was
unable "to resist, and therefore ...
there was no real or true choice in the matter."
Laderberg, supra note 15, at 351.
173. Amnesty International, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 3; Human Rights
Watch, Nowhere to Hide, supra note 3; Dinos, supra note 49.
174. Amnesty International, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 3; Human Rights
Watch, All Too Familiar,supra note 1; Human Rights Watch, Nowhere to Hide, supra note 3;
see also Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp.
634, 666 (D.D.C. 1994) ("By leaking private information [about complaints] prison officials
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prisoners, like black women traditionally, are excluded from the legal
"protection" supposedly offered to them by chivalrous archetypes. The
most pressing problem, for these women, is not the possibility that the
courts might "stereotype" them as "victims" (which they are), but that
the courts might refuse to protect them at all.175
The difficulty with the modesty critics' argument against
"stereotyping," as with many antistereotyping arguments, is that it
locates "the injury of stereotyping on the level of image, when the injury
of sexual harassment is both on the level of image and on the level of
reality., 176 As MacKinnon points out,
The parade of horrors demonstrating the systematic
victimization of women often produces the criticism that for me
to say women are victimized reinforces the stereotype that
women "are" victims, which in turn contributes to their
victimization. If this stereotype is a stereotype, it has already
been accomplished, and I come after. To those who think "it
isn't good for women to think of themselves as victims," and thus
seek to deny the reality of their victimization, how can it be good
for women to deny
what is happening to them? Since when is
177
politics therapy?
Unfortunately, the modesty critics miss the point that gender
stereotypes are not the primary cause of women's victimization. They
arise from and naturalize the gender inequality that also sets up
women's real-life vulnerability to sexual assaults by men. Though this
reality may conform to a gender stereotype, it is "no false picture or
illusion. These social relations themselves are shaped by an arguably
false but, nevertheless,
socially controlling image of relations between
78
women and men.'
This is not to argue that prisoners are passive in response to the
coerce women prisoners and staff into silence and insulate themselves from scrutiny.").
175. As Judge Green recognized in Women Prisoners,sexual harassment and abuse of
prisoners who have a history of sexual abuse "can lead to severe depression, reinforcement of
a 'victim' self-image and a belief that, as in childhood, they have no control over their lives."
877 F. Supp. at 643.
176. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A
CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 179 (1979) [hereinafter MACKINNON, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT].
177. CATHARINE A.

MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED:

DISCOURSES ON LIFE

AND LAW 220 (1987), quoted in Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in
Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304, 329 (1995).
178. MACKINNON, supra note 177, at 180.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[88:751

authority of their keepers: prison narratives show that prisoners, like
battered women, engage in "daily acts of self-preservation, familial
' to abusive--or merely
protection, and outright resistance"179
intrusive-

authority."8 Prisoners are not passive in the face of prison authority, but
"if you want to do something fun or something you enjoy, you have to
sneak.' 8' "[P]risoners who fight custody and control, who refuse to be
dependent or to agree with the authority's determinations about their
values and actions, maintain a sense of autonomy and control over their
own lives."' 82 The term "victim," then, is not moral, prescriptive, or
strategic:
"It is descriptive: who does what to whom and gets away with
83
it."9

Like battered women, though, all prisoners are constrained by the
economic and physical force of their keepers; in prison, this coercion,
"abusive and battering in its very nature, ' ' is conferred by law." 5 In
prison, "orders are given as to what prisoners wear, what they eat, how
much they eat, how they work, where they work, what they read, whom
they see, what they write, when they can write, when they can talk, and
what they can say. ' Prisoners who resist their subordination, either by
fighting back or by "ignor[ing] the regulations and maxims laid down to
govern their behavior,"'s' end up being labeled "'problem prisoners' and
they are apt to spend a lot of time in [solitary confinement] and be
labeled 'incorrigible.'... They are often denied parole ....
They often
stay in prison until expiration of sentence."' 88

179. Abrams, supra note 177, at 345; see also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,90 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1991).
180. See generally JOHN IRWIN, THE JAIL: MANAGING THE UNDERCLASS IN
AMERICAN SOCIETY 68 (1985); PAULA JOHNSON, INNER LIVES: VOICES OF AFRICANAMERICAN WOMEN IN PRISON (2003); WATTERSON, supra note 81, at 120-35; HARRIS,
supra note 16; RIERDEN, supra note 81.
181. WATrERSON, supra note 81, at 124.
182. Id. at 131.
183. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 87, at 138.
184. Id. at 129.
185. The analogy to domestic violence, though illuminating, should not be
overstretched. A number of salient difference include: prisoners ordinarily do not have a
loving (or formerly loving) relationship with their keepers; the authoritarian relationship
emanates from a group of guards, rather than from one man; while they fear for their
children's well-being, they do not ordinarily have reason for concern that guards may harm
them; and though the prison is authorized to use force to prevent the woman's escape; when
her custodial sentence is complete, separation violence is not a risk.
186. Id. at 130.
187. WATTERSON, supra note 81, at 131.
188. Id. at 132.
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Like a battering relationship, then, the relationship

between

prisoners and guards, even at the best-run institutions, can be
understood as a deeply skewed but "two-way struggle for power and

control."'8 9 Indeed, some prisoners argue that, in practice, prisoners run
the prisons."9 Perhaps to maintain a sense of "autonomy and control,"

many prisoners describe relationships with guards, in which they
exchange sex for cigarettes, food, drugs, or privileges such as visits or
telephone calls, as an exchange in which they are exploiting the guard,
rather than the other way around.'91 Of course, prisoners' needs to strike
such a bargain are created by guards' absolute authority over whether

and when prisoners can eat, smoke, take drugs, or talk to their friends
and families.
If women are being victimized by male guards in prison, it does them
no harm to expose the problem by saying so. Kimberl6 Crenshaw points

out that black women are often discouraged from speaking out about
sexual abuse because of concerns that, by speaking out about sexual
harassment by black men, black women "will reinforce negative racial
stereotypes about Blacks in general and about Black men in
particular."' ' This silencing suppresses knowledge of, and resistance to,

black women's oppression, in the name of protecting black people-that
is, men-from (sexualized) racial stereotyping. Of course, it is unlikely
that black women's silence would change sexualized racist ideas about
189. ABRAMS,
note 177, at 345-46; Mahoney,
note 179, at 53-60.
190. WATrERSON,
note 81, at 7. Teresa Miller argues that, in men's prisons,
guards and administrators are complicit in prisoners' establishment of a hierarchy of "real
men" on top, "queens" (gay men) below, and "punks" (straight men who are sexually
assaulted by "real men" because they are deemed more feminine) at the bottom. Miller,
supra note 28, at 304-08, 355. This hierarchy, she argues, helps the prison to
maintain order.
191. For example, Rierden quotes Delia Robinson, a long-term prisoner who "tries not
to get involved," describing the sexual "connivances" of other prisoners, who seek sex with
guards:
Delia calls them the spider women, "because they're always out to seduce and
destroy." One of the women got a nurse at the medical unit to fall in love with her.
The nurse, who used to bring the inmate grinders and cocaine, got fired. The same
inmate had an affair with a maintenance man. Then her roommate, spider woman
number two, fell in love with a female [guard], who ended up leaving her husband
and two children. The [guard] got fired but still comes to visit the inmate. "These
people can be very crafty if you're crazy enough to believe them," she says.
"They're real scroungers."
Rierdan,
note 81, at 158. Similarly, Jean Harris observes: "Flattery and flirting go a lot
further in here than a good day's work." HARRIS,
note 16, at 62.
192. Crenshaw,
supra note 14, at 1472.
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black men anyway.
In the same way, when feminists minimize or dismiss women
prisoners' reports that they are being abused by male guards to make
sure that women are not "stereotyped" as victims, they silence prisoners
without challenging the gender inequality that underlies the stereotype.
As Crenshaw observes, "[T]his silence creates a classic double bind. To
speak, one risks the censure of one's closest allies. To remain silent
renders one continually vulnerable to the kinds of abuses heaped upon
people who have no voice."1' 93
2. Stereotyping Men as Aggressors
Kapczynski, Miller, and Jurado vigorously critique the "stereotype"
that men are aggressors. They observe, accurately, that the differential
protection accorded to the bodily privacy interests of male and female
prisoners rests on the discriminatory assumption that "men, who are
socialized to take on harsh situations, are not negatively affected by
being viewed by women. This conclusion rests in part on the societal
view that men are not and cannot be threatened by women even if they
hold the power in the situation."' 94
The "stereotype" of male sexual aggressiveness and female sexual
vulnerability in prisons, Miller argues, is harmful because judges are
"writing rules around the fact that 'boys will be boys' rather than
facilitating a culture change within prisons that requires male guards to
conduct themselves professionally, and in the process, to respect the
basic human dignity of women prisoners."'95
Of course, it might plausibly be argued as well that the courts ought
not subject women prisoners to the ongoing risk of sexual assault while
they await the advent of the "culture change" whereby male guards will
learn to respect their human dignity.
In the Fourth Amendment privacy analysis, the heterosexuality of
both prisoners and guards tends to be assumed. 96 Miller criticizes the
"judicial assumption" that, "[i]n cross-gender search doctrine, the power
dynamic is always gendered and (hetero)sexed (that is to say, female

193. Id.
194. Jurado, supra note 29, at 40; see also Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1284; Miller, Sex
Surveillance,supra note 28, at 324-25.
195. Miller, Government's Hands,supra note 3, at 871.
196. The assumption of heterosexuality was noted by the Seventh Circuit in Canedy v.
Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 185 (7th Cir. 1994) and Johnson v. Phelan, 69 F.3d 144, 147 (7th Cir.
1995).
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prisoners are presumed to be at greater risk when male guards visually
monitor them in states of undress than when male prisoners are
identically monitored by female guards)."'"
Jurado goes further,
challenging the "stereotypical" notions that women prisoners will
experience physical body searches by male guards as sexually invasive,' 9"
and that "male guards cannot experience such touching as merely
professional." '
The modesty critics contend that the courts' gendered
interpretations of assault risks in prison are heterosexist: the courts
"assume that its [sic] is degrading to be view[ed] unclothed by a stranger
of the opposite sex only."'' "[O]nly the most egregious same-gender
search procedures have been found to be unconstitutional."2 0' The
assumption is that prisoners are safe when the guards who view or touch
them are of the same sex. Kapczynski asks "why it is less private to be
seen in a state of undress by one sex rather than the other, '2 °' pointing
out that "in no other realm of law does the 'privacy' of an act depend
upon not just who sees which
body under what conditions, but also upon
'
203
is.
viewer
the
sex
what
In describing the harm resulting from the gender stereotypes of
privacy law, the modesty critics express their deepest concern about the
effect of stereotyping on men. Miller is quite frank in expressing the
primacy of men's interests in confronting sex discrimination. She
acknowledges the risk that male guards' surveillance of women
prisoners will result in the guards assaulting them" while women
guards' surveillance of male prisoners will likely keep them safer.2°
Nonetheless, she contends, manly pride is more important than women's
safety:
To the extent that men are more accustomed to objectifying
women through the act of looking than vice-versa, men are

197. Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 874-75 n.37.

198. Jurado, supra note 29, at 52.
199. Id.
200. Miller, Government's Hands,supra note 3, at 874.
201. Jurado, supra note 29, at 33 (citing Draper v. Walsh, 790 F. Supp 1553, 1560 (W.D.
Okla. 1991) (holding that a policy of strip searching all persons arrested for traffic violations
and minor offences was unconstitutional)).
202. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1269 (emphasis omitted).
203. Id. at 1269 (emphasis omitted).
204. Miller, Sex Surveillance, supra note 28, at 338.
205. Id. at 299.
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disempowered by cross-gender surveillance, particularly when
partially or entirely undressed.
More accustomed to
objectification by men, women are similarly disempowered by
cross-sex surveillance, but no more so than before they were
.6
incarcerated 20

Apparently, degradation is more harmful to men than to women
because, lacking gender privilege, women have nothing to lose.
Kapczynski advocates that male prisoners be placed at the center of
feminist privacy analysis:
[C]onsider the sexual profiling question from the perspective of
male inmates. .. . Despite the fact that male guards appear to be

responsible for a considerable proportion of sexual assaults
against male inmates, there is no evidence, in case law or
otherwise, that prison administrators are attempting to remove
male guards from male housing units.'
She correctly notes that heterosexist norms fail to protect male
prisoners from sexual abuse by male guards. °8 However, she dismisses
out of hand the possibility of regulating male guards' sexualized
surveillance of male prisoners:
This is not to say that the best answer to sexual assaults in prison
is to remove men from all guard positions-quite the opposite. It
is to suggest that in almost every case, sex-neutral measures-for
example, improving reporting systems and prosecutions-will
likely be more effective at protecting inmates from sexual assault
and harassment (as well as other kinds of abuse) than sexual
profiling.0 9
Rather than proposing regulations to control male guards' access to
male prisoners, she proposes removing the restrictions on their access to
female prisoners instead. That way, prisoners of both sexes will be
exposed to the risk of sexual abuse by male guards. This is a textbook
206. Id. at 352 n.232.
207. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1290. "Though sexual assaults have become much
less frequent [in men's jails], they are still a significant element in jail folklore, and
inexperienced prisoners are very fearful of them." IRWIN, supra note 180, at 64.
208. See Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1290.
209. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1291 (emphasis omitted).
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example of "equality with a vengeance. 21°
Meanwhile, Miller, who exhorts the courts to seriously examine the
"sexualization of power in men's prisons, 21' expresses more concern for
the effect of cross-gender surveillance on male prisoners than on women
prisoners. She observes that male prisoners' society is divided into a
hierarchy of masculinity: "real men" at the top, who sexually exploit the
"queens" (gay men) below them, and sexually assault the "punks"
(straight men who are deemed feminine or weak) at the bottom. 2 She
contends that surveillance by a woman tends to feminize the man in the
prison hierarchy of masculinity:
In an environment where manhood is defined as the ability to resist
"feminization"-being forced to submit to sexual penetration (like a
woman)-within a larger sexist society that reinforces male dominance
over women, it is easy to understand how threatening it is for male
prisoners to be involuntarily subjected to the gaze-the visual
surveillance-of female guards. Female surveillance is unmanly in a
culture where manliness is highly prized and is therefore degrading.'
She criticizes the courts for "fail[ing] to take into account the
sexualization of power in men's prisons when considering the propriety
of female guards visually monitoring naked male prisoners. ' One can
only infer that her concern is that courts maintain the sexual and psychic
privileges of "real men" in the prison hierarchy by preventing their
demotion to the status of "punks." This vision of privacy offers no
protection to low-status "queens" or "punks" who have been genderdemoted and who are already at high risk of sexual abuse.
By contrast, Miller contends that male guards should be authorized
to conduct surveillance when the women are naked or using the toilet,
out of concern that preventing them from doing so would stereotype the
guards as abusers:
[W]hen judges presume the sexual vulnerability of female
210. See generally Meda Chesney-Lind & Jocelyn M. Pollock, Women's Prisons:
Equality with a Vengeance, in WOMEN, LAW & SOCIAL CONTROL 160 (Alida V. Merlo &
Jocelyn M. Pollock, eds., 1995); Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, Equality and the Economic
Consequences of Spousal Support: A Canadian Perspective, 7 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1,
13 (1994).
211. Miller, Sex Surveillance, supranote 28, at 308, 356.
212. Id. at 300-308, 355; see also Robertson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in United
States Prisons:Sexual HarassmeniAmongMale Inmates, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1999).
213. Miller, Sex Surveillance,supra note 28, at 308.
214. Id.
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prisoners, they conversely presume that male guards are sexually
aggressive. When judges employ gendered stereotypes of men as
sexually aggressive, and therefore limit the assignment of male
guards within the housing units of women's prisons, they are
accepting as a given that male guards are unable to respect the
human dignity of women when observing them nude in the act of
toileting, showering, and undressing. ...
Thus, for Miller, the harm of stereotyping men as sexual aggressors
merits more protection than the harm of exposing women to custodial
sexual abuse.
Kapczynski challenges the notion that concerns about custodial
sexual abuse in women's prisons-even in Everson, where custodial
sexual abuse proved to be a severe and intractable problem-can justify
a same-sex BFOQ for guards in women's prisons. She criticizes this
argument as an invidious form of sex discrimination, namely the
stereotypical "sexual profiling" of men as sexual aggressors." 6
Despite the risk and reality that male guards are abusing women in
U.S. women's prisons, and the fear that that abuse engenders when
women are, literally, exposed to male guards, the modesty critics insist
that prisoners be subjected to cross-gender searches and surveillance
that give rise to a fear of sexual abuse, in order to avoid stereotyping
men.
Kapczynski, unlike Miller and Jurado, expresses some concern about
the emotional toll of cross-gender searches on women prisoners. Unlike
Miller and Jurado, Kapczynski at least calls for "improv[ements to]
reporting systems and prosecutions ''217 to protect prisoners against
sexual abuse.1 s Miller and Jurado, by contrast, are content to continue
exposing prisoners to male guards in order to combat the stereotype
that men might abuse them-even though they do.
Kapczynski urges courts to "attend to who bears the costs of
changing gender norms" 219 when defining gender privacy.
As
215. Miller, Government's Hands,supra note 3, at 870-71.
216. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1281.
217. Id. at 1291.
218. I agree that "systemic.. . approaches" can be very effective as "prophylaxis against
abuse and anxiety about abuse because they will better serve to correct power imbalances
that generate risk of abuse and make that abuse so injurious." Id. at 1293. Systemic
solutions, once they are devised, should be implemented immediately. But until they take
effect, women prisoners are immeasurably safer from custodial sexual abuse if their guards
are women.
219. Id. at 1288.
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Kapczynski observes:
When male prison guards were assigned to conduct random,
clothed body searches of female inmates and [a Jordan v.
Gardnerplaintiff] was forced to undergo one against her will, she
was so distressed that "her fingers had to be pried loose from the
bars she had grabbed; she returned to her cell-block, vomited,
and broke down." We could insist, of course, that her reaction
was a kind of false consciousness, that she was misidentifying all
men as a threat, or at least misidentifying this man as a threat.
There is a way in which these things in fact might be true-but is
this the place to make that point? Would it be possible, in a
context in which approximately eighty-five percent of women
have been sexually or physically abused by men, to remake
220
associations between gender and assault by ignoring them?
Nonetheless, Kapczynski's commitment to gender neutrality causes
her to back down from the logical outcome of these questions, namely,
same-sex staffing in women's prisons. "This is not to say that the best
answer to sexual assaults in prison is to remove men from all guard
positions-quite the opposite. ' 22' Rather, in addressing cross-gender
search and surveillance, Kapczynski proposes, the courts should balance
the risk of stereotyping against its "costs," namely the fear and risk of
sexual abuse.22 In her balance, the symbolism of stereotype clearly
outweighs the reality of abuse. "[E]ffective resolution of this dilemma
will usually not reside in sex segregation, but rather in non-sex-specific
measures to alleviate
the kinds of risks and costs we too quickly identify
223
with sex itself.,
Sexual abuse, in prison as outside, is not a gender-neutral
224
phenomenon. Like sexual harassment, it is a "technology of sexism
by which traditional gender roles are constructed and enforced. As
Katherine Franke points out:
[S]exual harassment is a kind of sex discrimination not because
220. Id. (emphasis omitted).
221. Id. at 1291.
222. "[FJirst,... we must consider the symbolically as well as materially discriminatory
effects of gender norms to decide which norms to challenge, and, second,.., our inquiry must
not end there." Id. at 1282 (emphasis omitted).
223. Id.
224. Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV.
691, 696 (1997).
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the conduct would not have been undertaken if the victim had

been a different sex, not because it is sexual, and not because
men do it to women, but precisely because.., it perpetuates,
enforces, and polices a set of gender norms that seek to feminize
women and masculinize men.
The employment of male guards in women's prisons-regardless of
the actual sexual orientation of prisoners or guards-creates a power
dynamic that is "gendered and (hetero)sexed".226 Outside prison, men
are overwhelmingly perpetrators and not victims of custodial sexual
abuse; the victims are overwhelmingly women. 27 Male, not female,
guards are nearly exclusively the perpetrators of sexual abuse in men's
prisons. Because sexual abuse tends to masculinize the perpetrators as

well as feminize its victims,2" it is extremely rare-though it has
happened 2 9-that

female guards are alleged to have sexually abused

225. Id.
226. Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 875 n.37.
227. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991); Amnesty International, supra
note 3.
228. Franke, supra note 224, at 696-98; Miller, Sex Surveillance, supra note 28, at 308,
338; Robertson, supra note 212, at 9-11. MacKinnon suggests that this is true of normative
heterosexual relations in general. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra
note 87, at 178-79. As MacKinnon points out,
[Sexually coercive] behaviors are almost never observed in women. Powerful social
conditioning of women to passivity, gentleness, submissiveness, and receptivity to
male initiation, particularly in sexual contact, tends effectively to constrain women
from expressing aggression (or even assertion) sexually, or sexuality assertively.
MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 176, at 156.
229. Human Rights Watch has documented "rare" instances of sexual abuse of women
prisoners by female guards. Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar,supra note 1.
Women guards are also capable of abusing their power to sexually abuse and humiliate
male prisoners, as was extensively documented in coverage of the torture and sexual abuse
committed by U.S. troops at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2003-04. See, e.g., Seymour Hersh,
Torture at Abu Ghraib: American Soldiers Brutalized Iraqis. How Far up Does the
Responsibility Go?, THE NEW YORKER, May 10, at 42; Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command:
How the Department of National Defence Mishandled the Disasterat Abu Ghraib, THE NEW
YORKER, May 17, 2004, at 38; Seymour Hersh, The Gray Zone: How a Secret Pentagon
ProgramCame to Abu Ghraib, THE NEW YORKER, May 24, 2004, at 38.
In three 1997 Illinois cases, male prisoners alleged systematic and humiliating sexual
harassment by female guards. In their complaints, each of the prisoners alleged that he was
handcuffed, taken to a room where approximately eight male and female guards were
waiting, and ordered to strip. When they refused, they were threatened with bodily harm.
No investigative reason was given for the searches. Each was allegedly forced to perform
humiliating acts such as "spreading his buttocks for them to see," while the guards made
"sexual ribald comments." Dorn and Calhoun alleged that the guards told them, "You have
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male or female prisoners. 20 "[G]iven existing sex roles,"23 sexual
harassment by women "will probably be only slightly more common
than occurrences of a man raped by a woman or incest initiated by
women against male children. . . . The rarity 232 of such instances

demonstrates how deep the social determinants go.
The absolute authority of prison guards invites not only sexual, but
also physical and psychological abuse, which may be perpetrated by

guards of any gender upon prisoners of any gender. As Miller argues,
powerful "stereotypes of men as sexual aggressors and women either as

sexual

victims (female prisoners)

or asexual nurturers

(female

guards)" '33 should not overshadow the "actual disparity of power that

exists between correctional officers and inmates. ' ,234 Jurado points out
that it is a "gendered stereotype that women do not235 have power over
men, even when women hold the keys to the prison.,

Indeed, the exposure of the atrocities committed by U.S. troops at
Abu Ghraib, a U.S.-run detention facility in Iraq, demonstrates that

when prison authorities create an institutional culture that encourages
and condones the sexual, physical, and psychological abuse of prisoners,
female guards may join with their male colleagues in sexual, as well as
physical and psychological, torture.236

It cannot, therefore, be assumed that women prisoners are entirely
safe when the guards to whose absolute control they are subjected are

women, rather than men. Indeed, women detainees still feel deeply
humiliated when female guards perform invasive inspections of their

no rights in the penitentiary, and females' rights to equal employment supersedes prisoners'
right to privacy." Dorn v. DeTella, No. 96 C 3830, 1997 WL 85145, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24,
1997); Calhoun v. DeTella, No. 96 C 3564, 1997 WL 75658, at *2 (N.D. I11.Feb. 18, 1997);
Hollimon v. DeTella, No. 96 C 3452, 1997 WL 45309 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1997).
230. Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar, supra note 1; Human Rights Watch,
Nowhere to Hide,supra note 3; Amnesty International, Not Partof My Sentence, supra note 3;
Coomaraswamy, supra note 3.
231. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 176, at 202.
232. Id.
233. Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 863.
234. Id.
235. Jurado, supra note 29, at 53. However, even when men have the keys to the prison,
Jurado insists that it is a sexist "gender role stereotype" to consider women "powerless and
subject to the authority of men." Id. at 52.
236. See supra note 229. It is tempting to speculate as to whether systematic custodial
sexual abuse would have occurred at Abu Ghraib if the prison authorities had not condoned
it (as they did) and the guard staff was not overwhelmingly male (as it was). I am not aware
of any prison environments in which an overwhelmingly female guard staff has developed a
practice of widespread and systematic sexual abuse of prisoners.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

genitalia.237

[88:751

I would certainly argue that Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth

Amendment doctrines be reconceptualized to offer real protection to
prisoners from every kind of custodial abuse. As an intermediate step,
however, women-only staffing policies in women's prisons, and mixedgender staffing policies in men's prisons, would, at a minimum, greatly
reduce the likelihood and occurrence of custodial sexual abuse.
B. Modesty and Women Prisoners:An IntersectionalAnalysis
Miller argues that "judges employ stereotypes of incarcerated

2 39
women as modest and in need of protection from their own sexuality.
In this Article, I contend that this is not the case. As Kapczynski points
out, prisons are the only context in which courts invert their "usual
tendency to value privacy over employment rights." 2" Indeed, prisons
are the only context in which courts have "question[ed] the logic that
'
conflates notions of privacy with notions of sex."241

Kapczynski

recognizes that this disparity reflects that the bodies of male and female
prisoners are "seen as less sacrosanct 2 42 than those of women in the
outside world.
The modesty critics challenge a stereotype of the chaste, modest

victim that is not universal. It ordinarily applies to "economically
comfortable" white women243-not the poor women of color who
237. JOHNSON, supra note 180, at 41.

238. See generally Iman R. Soliman, Male Officers in Women's Prisons: The Need for
Segregation of Officers in Certain Positions,10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 45 (2000).
239. Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 865-66.
240. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1266 n.52.
241. Id. at 1272 (emphasis omitted) (citing Gunther v. Iowa State Reformatory, 462 F.
Supp. 952, 956 n.4 (N.D. Iowa 1979)); Griffin v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 654 F. Supp. 690, 701
(E.D. Mich. 1982). In Griffin, the court held:
Mores as to being viewed naked by members of the opposite sex under certain
circumstances are bound to change as women become further integrated into the
occupational and professional world .... The traditional rule that only a male guard
may view male inmates under these conditions may derive from just the type of
stereotypical value system condemned by Title VII.
Id.
242. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1273.
243. Nancy Ehrenreich, Subordination and Symbiosis: Mechanisms of Mutual Support
Between Subordinating Systems, 71 UMKC L. REV. 251, 307 (2002). In this article,
Ehrenreich observed:
[T]he very same set of stereotypes that privileges economically comfortable white
women also subordinates them. Seen as nurturers, they struggle to be thought of as
rational, competent, public actors. Seen as passive sexual objects, they must fight to
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populate U.S. women's prisons."
Over the past ten years, the rate of increase in imprisonment of
black and Hispanic women has exceeded the rate of increase for white
women.2 " Today, the overwhelming majority of U.S. women prisoners
are black or Latina. 24' Their treatment in prison, particularly the lack of
assault, may reflect the devaluation of
protection or redress for sexual
247
these women in this society.
Representations of black men and women as criminals and of
women as sexual objects intersect to create an image of "[b]lack women
248
as sexual deviants-as a combination of the criminal and the sexual.,2 49
As deviants, they are stereotyped as violent, not as potential victims.

As sexual deviants, they lack credibility in the justice system.25 ° Even
when their accounts of sexual abuse are believed, these myths and
stereotypes "also influence whether the insult and the injury [black
women have] experienced is thought to be relevant or important. '25'
attain a sense of, and a recognition of, their sexual agency. Seen as weaker and less
aggressive than white men, they find their options limited by patriarchal norms.
Thus, both their subordination and their dominant status are effectuated by the
same set of stereotypes.
Id.
244. The majority of women in U.S. women's prisons are African-American or Latina.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT: WOMEN OFFENDERS 7 (1999) [hereinafter DOJ, WOMEN
OFFENDERS]; Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar,supra note 1; Amnesty International,
Not Partof My Sentence, supra note 3.
245. Amnesty International, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 3 ("The rate of
increase of imprisonment of black and Hispanic women has slightly exceeded the rate of
increase of imprisonment of white women throughout this decade (From 1990-96, the
number of imprisoned white females increased by 67%, black females by 72% and Hispanic
females by 71%.)") (citation omitted).
246. DOJ, WOMEN OFFENDERS, supra note 244, at 7 (explaining the racial breakdown
of the women's prison population as follows in Federal prisons: "Black" 35%, "Hispanic"
32%, "White" 29%, Other 4%. State prisons: Black 48%, Hispanic 15%, White 33%, Other
4% and for local jails: Black 44%, Hispanic 15%, White 36%, Other 5%).
247. See generally Crenshaw, Race, Gender, supra note 14, at 1471-72.
248. Id. at 1471.
249. See generally Fenton, supra note 24; Schneider, infra note 346.
250. Crenshaw, Race, Gender, supra note 14, at 1470 ("In our own legal system ....
[b]ecause Black women were not expected to be chaste ... they were [seen as] unlikely to tell
the truth.").
251. Id. For example, an administrator at the women's correctional facilities of the
District of Columbia testified that, even where a prisoner's allegations of sexual abuse are
believed, the department takes the view that it cannot act against the guard:
There are ... cases where we believe the inmate. In fact, the inmate's story in some
cases is more credible than the employee's story, but you cannot take adverse or
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Crenshaw identifies the pervasive stereotypical belief among jurors that
"[b]lack women are different from white women and that sexually
abusive

behavior
2

directed

toward

them

is

somehow

less

objectionable.,
The sexual stereotype that the modesty critics attribute to "women"
in general is racialized and class-based, as well as being gendered." 3

Either these scholars really believe-despite their acknowledgment that
custodial sexual abuse is commonplace in women's prisons-that the

"modesty" of women prisoners is being overprotected against sexual

abuse, or they are willing to sacrifice women prisoners' sexual integrity
in order to transform the stereotypes that afflict male guards and
middle-class white women. This disparity heightens Kapczynski's
concern about "who bears the costs" of challenging gender norms.
It is true, as Kapczynski observes, that "notions of bodily modesty
25 4
and chastity.., have long operated to deny women sexual autonomy.,

However, this stereotype, as she describes it, applied to respectable,
richer, white women, a subgroup whose members were and are rarely
imprisoned. 5 This stereotype exists only in contrast to its flip side: the
corrective action against the employee because you believe the inmate over the
employee. In cases like that we relocate the employee and make sure the employee
does not come in contact with that inmate, does not work in that institution.
Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep't of Corr. v. District of Columbia, 877 F. Supp. 634, 642
(D.D.C. 1994) (quoting evidence of William Plaut, Deputy Director of Operations and Acting
Deputy Director for Programs).
252. Crenshaw, Race, Gender, supra note 14, at 1470. While the average sentence for a
man convicted of sexually assaulting a white woman is ten years, the average sentence for a
man convicted of sexually assaulting a black woman is two years. Id.
253. This demonstrates that even feminists of color must be vigilant to avoid what
Adrienne Davis describes as "white solipsism" in feminist theory. Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in FeministLegal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 588 (1990).
254. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1284.
255. For example, Watterson observes:
[I]n Washington, D.C., administrators say that every class of woman is arrestedwhite, black, rich, poor. But after the initial hearings, it is the poor black and poor
white women who are held in jail. Two women are arrested for larceny or petty
theft. The bail is set at $3,000. The white woman is out of custody within hours.
The black woman spends months in jail awaiting trial. One study showed that black
women have a one-and-a-half times greater chance of being returned to jail after
their initial hearing than white women.
Another study in... Pennsylvania showed that bail and fines tended to be
higher and sentences longer for black women than for white women on similar
charges. One exception was that courts seemed to be more offended when white
women practiced prostitution, and thus set their bail higher than for their black
counterparts.
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image of the "bad" black woman or prostitute, who is unchaste,
immodest, and undeserving of protection. 6
The treatment of black women in prison has always reflected this
degrading stereotype. Davis observes that prisons have traditionally
served to enforce racially stereotyped gender roles for women.2 5 7
Women's prisons sought to "encourage and ingrain 'appropriate' gender
258
roles, such as vocational training in cooking, sewing, and cleaning,,
and women's "reformatory cottages were usually designed with
kitchens, living rooms, and even some nurseries for prisoners with
infants., 25 9 "[Fleminized modes of punishment-the cottage system,
domestic training, etc.-were designed, ideologically, to reform white
women, relegating women of color, in large part, to realms of public
punishment that made no pretense of offering them femininity. ' 2 °
Black women were not offered the more humane conditions offered
for the refeminization of white women. If they were admitted to
women's reformatories, they were often segregated from white
women.2 1' Furthermore, they were often incarcerated in men's prisons,
where they
"endured the cruelties of the convict lease system
unmitigated by the feminization of punishment; neither their sentences,
nor the labor 262they were compelled to do, were lessened by virtue of
their gender.,
Today, neither prison nor society has undergone any epiphany by
which black prisoners have been transformed into stereotypically chaste,
modest ladies who require vigorous protection. For example, in Lucas
v. White,263 male guards were alleged to have "committed, orchestrated
and facilitated" sexual abuse of women prisoners at a California
detention facility. 2' Although both white and African American women
prisoners were abused, the white women were transferred immediately
WATIERSON, supra note 81, at 34-35.
256. Id.; see TONI MORRISON, RACE-ING JUSTICE, ENGENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON
ANITA HILL, CLARENCE THOMAS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (1992);

Davis, supra note 3, at 346; Crenshaw, Race, Gender, supra note 14, at 1471; Ehrenreich,
supra note 243, at 269.
257. Id.
258. Davis, supra note 3, at 346.
259. Id.

260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.; see also JOHNSON, supra note 180, at 32.
263. Amnesty International, Not Part of My Sentence, supra note 3 (citing Lucas v.
White, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (N.D. Cal. 1999)).
264. Lucas, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1046.
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after they reported their abuse to officials, but the African American
women were not moved for another three days. During those three
days, the African American women were subjected to retaliatory sexual
abuse. One of the women reported that, during these three days, she
was "beaten, raped and sodomized by three men who in the course of
the attack told her that they were 2 attacking
her in retaliation for
65
providing a statement to investigators.
The modesty mystique, which constructs "respectable" white women
as modest, chaste, and needing chivalrous protection, does subordinate
women prisoners, but not in the direct way that Kapczynski, Miller, and
Jurado suggest. Black women and women prisoners are not stereotyped
as modest ladies; they are exposed to sexual abuse because they do not
fit that stereotype.266
As Kapczynski points out, same-sex privacy jurisprudence
"construct[s] women's bodies as more private than men's, by insisting
that women have an inviolable 'right' to same-sex privacy that men do
not.... [This] resonates uncomfortably with the historical construction
of women's bodies 26and
concerns as the domain of the private rather
7
sphere.,
public
than
Women are considered more "private" than men in part because
they were viewed as the property of men.2 68 However, black women and
prostitutes were considered less "private" than white women.
Respectable white women were constructed as the property of one man:
the only man who could legally sexual assault one was her husband.269
By contrast, black women, prostitutes, unchaste women, working
women,270 and other nontraditional women were, in a sense, the property
265. Id.
266. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, WOMEN, RACE AND CLASS 175-77 (1981).
267. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1284.
268. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 176, at 169-70.
269. Thus, all common law torts with respect to sexual interference rested on a common
premise: "that a man's wife's sexuality belonged to him, in the sense that another man was
liable to him in damages for sexual acts with her, even with her consent. This attitude may be
no less prevalent although it is no longer legally enforceable in this way." Id.
270. Even today,
[m]en in almost every working context attribute sexual desire to women workers
based upon their mere presence as workers in that particular environment. This
assumption is professed equally about women who are seen as anomalies on the job
(any woman who would seek a male-defined work situation must be there because
of men) as for those who are in women's jobs (any woman who would choose a
feminine job must be looking for a man.).
Id. at 50.
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of all men. It was basically legal for any man to assault them."1 As
Professor Angela Harris points out:
[A]s a legal matter, the experience of rape did not even exist for
black women. During slavery, the rape of a black woman by any
man, white or black, was simply not a crime. Even after the Civil
War, rape laws were seldom used to protect black women against
either white or black men, since black women were considered
promiscuous by nature. In contrast to the partial or at least
formal protection white women had against sexual brutalization,
black women frequently had no legal protection whatsoever.272
Privacy and property traditionally converged to establish a zone of
protection for men, within which they could abuse women without
interference from the law.273 Professor Zanita Fenton's observations
regarding domestic violence are equally apposite to custodial abuses in
prison:
Relegation of [domestic violence] to the private is tantamount to
forced silence; it is in the public arena where public debate and
speech have meaningful impact. Ironically this is precisely the
reason this crime is the most serious and deserving of the most
vociferous public condemnations. "In no other category of
violent crime does one find the offender going home to live with
the victim." The interaction of patriarchy with the concepts of
the "private" dictate the manner in which issues of domestic
abuse are addressed. Unfortunately, judicial silence on these
issues not only contributes to the "private" conceptualization,
but also denies a primary avenue for public awareness, one with
the weight of authority to change the status quo.274
"'In private,"' MacKinnon contends, "means more than 'while

271. As Professor MacKinnon observes, "From women's point of view, rape is not
prohibited; it is regulated." MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 87,
at 179.
272. Harris, supra note 253, at 599; see also DAVIS, supra note 266, 175-76; Kimberld
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1251 n.35 (1991)
273. Fenton, supra note 24, at 1017; MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note

176, at 161-62.
274. Fenton, supra note 24, at 1017-18.
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' making it an area
alone.'... Privacy sanctifies the zone of the sexual,"275
that is safe from judicial scrutiny. "Such a conception of the 'private' ...
turns men's 'right to be let alone' into a shield behind which isolated
women can be sexually abused one at a time" 276 -or, in prison, en masse.

III. BEYOND MODESTY: PRIVACY AND THE RISK OF CUSTODIAL
SEXUAL ABUSE

A. A Reinterpretationof Privacy: Freedomfrom Fear of Sexual Abuse

As Kapczynski observes, "an unspoken but looming concern about
sexual abuse, 277 hovers in the background of all same-sex privacy cases.
Because this concern remains unacknowledged in nonprison cases,
privacy law is currently interpreted in a way that assesses the unspoken
risk based on fears and prejudices about the imagined propensity of
black and working-class men to sexually assault or affront middle-class
white women.

278

In this Article, I seek to bring this unacknowledged concern into the
open in order to more honestly address the reasons courts should grant
or refuse claims to privacy in prison.279 If the courts directly confront the

concern about sexual abuse in privacy claims, they can more easily
distinguish real risks from fears that arise from discriminatory
conjecture. I propose an alternate vision of privacy that, unlike
contemporary privacy doctrine, will protect prisoners against the risk of
custodial sexual abuse that, for them, has proven to be all too real.
Fourth Amendment privacy is an individual constitutional right.
Theoretically, it makes little sense to construe its primary aim as the
erosion of gender stereotypes. The purpose of a Fourth Amendment
privacy claim is to protect the prisoner, not to facilitate prison
administration, as the courts have interpreted it,' and not to eradicate

275. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 176, at 162.
276. Id.
277. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1280.
278. Id. at 1287. In North American law and society, the archetypal rape is imagined to
be one committed by a black stranger against a white woman. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note
266, at 172-74; SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987); MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE, supra note 87, at 175-76, 181; Phyllis L. Crocker, Crossing the Line: Rape-Murder
and the Death Penalty, 26 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 689, 706-07 (2000).

279. The privacy analysis I propose here may also be applicable, with modifications, to
nonconstitutional privacy claims outside the prison context, but that is not the focus of this
Article.
280. See generally supra Part I.
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symbolic harms to persons other than the claimant-especially when
those persons, such as male guards, are adverse in interest to the
prisoner-plaintiff, or, like middle-class white women, are greatly
advantaged in comparison with her (or him). Particularly in light of the
high incidence of sexual abuse by guards in women's and men's prisons,
the primary purpose of prisoners' bodily privacy should be to protect
them against custodial abuse.
If privacy law is to protect prisoners against sexual abuse, it must be
gender-conscious, not gender-neutral. Custodial sexual abuse is a
deeply gendered practice, no matter what the genders of victim and
perpetrator." ' If privacy is to have a hope of preventing sexual abuse
and harassment, a gender-blind solution will not likely work any better
than color-blind solutions work to eradicate racism.'
If the privacy
guarantee is to encompass a right to be free from the threat and reality
of sexual abuse, it must recognize that these threats and realities are
gendered.
At present, the Fourth Amendment affords little meaningful
protection to women prisoners against the conditions that leave them
vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse.
In its current
discriminatory interpretation, it serves essentially to propertize
prisoners as women, and to deny their vulnerability as men.
Thus, as
in the law of domestic violence, prison privacy law creates a zone in
which prisoners, male and female, cannot challenge the search and
surveillance that puts them at risk of sexual abuse. As slave law did to
African slaves, prison privacy law does for their descendants: "from the
experiential perspective of blacks, there was and is no such thing as
'slave law.' The legal system did not provide blacks with structured
''
expectations, promises, or reasonable reliances of any sort.
How, then, to rehabilitate "privacy," making it a genuine,
281. See supra notes 224-232 and accompanying text.
282. Indeed, as many critical race scholars have noted, race-blind interpretation of
prohibitions on race discrimination end up benefiting the racially privileged, whites, at the
expense of the racially subordinated, people of color. Color-blind race equality "denies the
real linkage between race and oppression under systematic white supremacy." Cheryl I.
Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1768 (1993) [hereinafter Harris,
Whiteness]; see generally id. at 1768-77; Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is
Colorblind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 40-52 (1991). As is demonstrated in Part ILA, an
analogous problem arises from gender-blind approaches to subordination.
283. Jurado, supra note 29, at 51; Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1290-91; Miller, Sex
Surveillance,supra note 28, at 296.
284. Patricia Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed Ideals from Deconstructed
Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401,417 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
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enforceable legal claim by prisoners, rather than a constitutional
immunity for prisons? As Miller urges, Fourth Amendment privacy
doctrine must be reinterpreted "in a manner that deals realistically with
the contours of life in prison." It must embody a "contextualized notion
of personal privacy that goes beyond gendered stereotypes to vest
privacy in the body."8 5
As the District Court held in Galvan v. Carothers,' minimum
standards of privacy should "include the right not to be subject to sexual
advances, to use the toilet without being observed by members of the
opposite sex, and to shower without being viewed by members of the
opposite sex." 7 However, the basis for this privacy interest is not
"decency" or "modesty," as the court suggested in this and many other
cases;2 8 as was demonstrated in Parts I and II, privacy as modesty offers
inadequate protection to women prisoners, and almost none to men.
The interest protected by prisoners' privacy must be understood to
encompass a right to be free from sexual abuse and from the threat of it.
If Fourth Amendment privacy is to reduce women prisoners'
vulnerability to sexual abuse, it must be interpreted to protect them
against the fear of sexual assault, as well as against all forms of sexual
abuse, including sexual assault, harassment, and exploitation. 9 Lisa
Krim observes:
Women inmates not only experience the degradation of having
the most intimate parts of their bodies exposed or explored, but
also experience the fear that male guards will abuse their power
in the situation and rape or sexually abuse them. This fear of
rape is doubly painful because the search itself and the fear of
future rape or sexual abuse resurrects the pain many female
inmates have suffered in past rapes or sexual abuse.2 9
Krim argues persuasively that the "pervasive fear of sexual abuse"
experienced by women prisoners "is a form of cruel and unusual
punishment that women inmates experience during intrusive searches or
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 886.
855 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alaska 1994).
Id. at 291.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See also LOUISE ARBOUR et al., COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO CERTAIN EVENTS
AT THE PRISON FOR WOMEN IN KINGSTON, ch. 4.2.9 (Ottawa: Public Works and
Government Services Canada, 1996).
290. Krim, supra note 15, at 107-08.
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exposure of their bodies to male guards" that male prisoners do not
share when searched by or exposed to women.
Since the "deliberate
indifference" standard seems to preclude Eighth Amendment liability,
Fourth Amendment privacy can and should be expanded to recognize a

constitutional privacy interest-as part of a substantive right to human
dignity-that encompasses a right to be free from state-imposed fear of
sexual assault.293
Like Miller, I advocate that "the privacy-based challenges to cross-

gender searches [should be viewed] more broadly as claims to human
dignity

and

personhood

generally

denied

prisoners."2 94

The

incorporation of a right to human dignity into the Fourth Amendment's
"privacy" provisions is consistent not only with U.S. constitutional law,295
but also with the international law obligations of the U.S., which require

it to respect and ensure the rights of prisoners (and others) to human
dignity.296 A Fourth Amendment right to freedom from the threat of
291. Id. at 108.
292. See, e.g., Dinos, supra note 49, at 291; Laderberg, supra note 15, at 328.
Furthermore, in Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1995), the Tenth Circuit
held that a well-founded fear of sexual abuse was insufficiently serious to provide any basis
for an Eighth Amendment violation. In this case, a guard repeatedly commented on the
prisoner's body and boasted about his sexual prowess. One night, while Ms. Adkins was
sleeping, the guard entered her cell and looked at her, then told her she had "nice breasts."
Although Adkins apparently did not make any explicit Fourth Amendment claim, she alleged
that "the right of privacy is not entirely extinguished in a prison setting nor exclusively
bounded by the contours of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 1036. She argued that the
guard's behavior constituted an "implicit threat.., sufficient to amount to a type of physical
assault." Id. The Court held that the guard's conduct constituted a de minimis threat which
did not meet the Eighth Amendment threshold. Id. at 1037.
293. As Justice Wilson observed for a plurality of the Supreme Court of Canada in Singh
v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 207, any
meaningful concept of "'security of the person' must encompass freedom from the threat of
physical punishment or suffering as well as freedom from such punishment itself."
294. Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 884.
295. Bell v. Wolfish, 444 U.S. 520, 577 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) ("The overriding function of the
Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion
by the state."); Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063, 1068 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
prisoner has a "constitutional right to be secure in her bodily integrity and free from attack by
prison guards," including a right not to be sexually assaulted).
296. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Preamble, Art. 10(1). Art.
10(1) provides: (1) All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. The Human Rights Committee
requires that personal and body searches of prisoners and detainees be conducted "in a
manner consistent with the dignity of the person being searched." Eur. H.R. Comm., General
Comment 16, supra note 94, at 8; see also Body of Principles for the Protection of All
Persons
under
Any
Form
of
Imprisonment,
Dec.
9
1988,
at
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sexual assault could serve as an important step toward operationalizing
the concept of human dignity.
Given that fears of sexual assault may reflect real risks, groundless
stereotypes, or some point in between, the question arises: which fears
merit constitutional protection as justiciable Fourth Amendment
privacy interests?
Kapczynski identifies two ways in which cross-gender supervision
may engage the kind of "anxiety associated with the sense of exposure
to risk of sexual assault and harassment ' ' 291 that merits recognition as a
privacy interest: "one associated with the fact that assault or harassment
may occur in scenes of cross-sex bodily exposure and the other
associated with the fear of assault, or in more extreme cases, the sense
that cross-sex exposure itself is assaulting., 298 I would add a third
consequence: Beyond the subjective fear engendered when male guards
are allowed to view or touch women prisoners who have been abused by
men in the past, cross-gender search and surveillance also creates an
unnecessary risk that women will be sexually harassed or abused.29
Lisa Krim argues that the courts should assess prisoners' fear of
sexual abuse based on a "reasonable woman" standard." This standard,
of course, offers little protection to men who have been abused. It
would also likely fail to protect women prisoners. 3° Because of their
history of prior sexual abuse by men, many prisoners are
hypersensitized to sexual abuse. Some of them may fear sexual abuse
even when the male guards to whom they are exposed present no actual
risk in the circumstances (although it is difficult to imagine how the
absence of risk could be proven).3 2° Moreover, not all prisoners will be
equally sensitized to sexual abuse; not all the plaintiffs in Jordan
experienced a reaction as severe as the one described above. 3 Yet,
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/43/a43r173.htm,
Principle 1: ("All persons under any
form of detention or imprisonment shall be treated in a humane manner and with respect for
the inherent dignity of the human person.").
297. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1288-89.
298. Id. at 1289 (emphasis omitted).
299. Human Rights Watch, All Too Familiar,supra note 1; Amnesty International, Not
Partof My Sentence, supra note 3.
300. Krim, supra note 15, at 117-18.
301. This is particularly true because Krim's proposed "reasonable woman"
incorporates standards of "decency" that, as the modesty critics point out, are inherently
discriminatory, and tend not to work for women prisoners because they are not seen by the
courts as decent women. Id.
302. Laderberg, supra note 15, at 338.
303. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1534-36 (9th Cir. 1992).
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presumably, it is the most sensitive prisoners who most urgently require
the Fourth Amendment's protection against search and surveillance that
could traumatize them-even if their fears, based on traumatic past
experiences, may not be entirely rational.
On the other hand, a subjective determination would likely be
unpalatable to courts, which would be reluctant to constrain prison
administrators' staffing decisions on the basis of objectively baseless
prisoner fears. To distinguish legitimate from discriminatory bases for
privacy claims, then, the best solution is to require the prisoner privacy
claimant to adduce evidence, on a balance of probabilities, that either
(1) the impugned search or surveillance heightens the risk of sexual
abuse (including sexual harassment as well as touching); or (2) the
search or surveillance itself is traumatic because of the fear of abuse that
it engenders. In balancing this privacy interest against guards' Title VII
claims, the courts should acknowledge that prisoners' right to be free
from the fear or risk of sexual abuse outweighs male guards' interest in
"equality" with female guards with respect to the kinds of intrusive
search and surveillance, such as body searches or viewing of naked
prisoners, that give rise to that fear and risk.?°
It may be an uphill battle to convince the courts that prisoners'
Fourth Amendment privacy should incorporate a substantive right to
"human dignity." In an era of mass incarceration and "getting tough"
on prisoners, imprisonment is-and is intended to be-dehumanizing."5
However, Women Prisoners,Robino, and Jordan offer some hope that
the courts might at least be prepared to recognize a more limited
constitutional right of prisoners, under the Fourth or Eighth
Amendments, to be free from the threat of sexual assault.
B. Advantages of Privacy As ProtectionAgainst Sexual Abuse
The approach I propose in this article-Fourth Amendment privacy
as a right to human dignity which includes, but is not limited to, freedom

304. Krim asks the following: "When a search requires that male guards touch women's
most intimate body parts, the woman inmate will have tremendous difficulty proving to
another guard that a 'flat hand,' the appropriate procedure, became a 'grab.' Who will
believe her?" Krim, supranote 15, at 108.
305. Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 884; see also HARRIS, supra note 16;
RIERDEN, supra note 16; WATTERSON, supra note 81; Davis, supra note 3, at 347 ("In the
twentieth century, women's prisons have begun to look more like their male counterparts,
particularly those ... constructed in the era of the prison industrial complex. As corporate
involvement in punishment begins to mirror corporate involvement in military production,
rehabilitation is becoming displaced by penal aims of incapacitation.").
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from the fear and reality of sexual abuse-offers several advantages
over the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding prisoners'
privacy. First, it redirects the courts' attention from a focus on
prisoners' genteel feminine modesty (or lack thereof) to the power
disparity between guards and prisoners.' °6
This approach also helps transcend the false dichotomy between
"victimization" and "agency." 3" Vulnerability to sexual assault is a
common concern of women, whether or not they have actually been
victims of gendered violence." Moreover, while privacy as modesty
undoubtedly reinforces gender stereotypes, privacy as protection against
sexual abuse can potentially protect prisoners of either gender against
sexual abuse by guards of any gender without relying on gender, race, or
class stereotypes to do so.
Recognition of such a right would also lay the groundwork for a
right of prisoners to be free from the less violent forms of sexual abuse,
such as verbal sexual harassment, groping, and quid pro quo sexual
coercion. The courts have often failed to treat sexual harassment as
sufficiently serious to merit constitutional scrutiny.m As Fenton points
out, gendered violence is not "something we need only deal with in its
extreme manifestations. We need to understand that the potential for
violence is part of human reality and is a phenomenon we should deal
with on a more comprehensive basis."31 In circumstances in which the
harasser has absolute control over every aspect of the prisoner's life,
sexual harassment is often a precursor to a more violent form of sexual
assault, and prisoners are entitled to constitutional protection from it.3"
306. As MacKinnon points out, "Resistance to sexual harassment can be misconstrued
as a revival of moral delicacy only until it is grasped that sexual harassment is less an issue of
right and wrong than an issue of power." MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note
176, at 184.
307. Schneider, infra note 346.
308. MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 87, at 133-35.
309. See, e.g., Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034 (10th Cir. 1995) (sexual harassment of
woman prisoner by male guard a de minimis violation that did not engage the Eighth
Amendment).
310. Fenton, supra note 24, at 1038-39.
311. As Judge Green held in Women Prisoners:
There is a substantial risk of injury when officers make sexual remarks in an
environment where sexual assaults of women prisoners by officers are well known
and inadequately addressed. In free society, a woman who experiences harassment
may seek the protection of police officers, friends, coworkers or relevant social
service agencies. She may also have the option of moving to locations where the
harassment would no longer occur. In sharp contrast, the safety of women prisoners
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Moreover, sexual harassment by guards is a violation of human dignity
sufficiently serious to merit constitutional protection in itself, quite apart
from the realistic fear of sexual assault it engenders. 2
Intrusive surveillance of women prisoners by male guards, even if
condoned by the prison administration, gives rise to a fear of sexual
assault: "Routine invasions of bodily privacy, such as men peering into
women's cells.., or the unannounced presence of male guards in female
living areas provide a reminder to women prisoners that their exposure
to abuse is almost endless."3 '3 The Fourth Amendment's protections
against unreasonable search should take this reality into account.
Furthermore, Fourth Amendment protection from the threat of
sexual assault would also strengthen women prisoners' constitutional
claims that they should not be guarded by men at all. All guards have
near-absolute authority over every aspect of prisoners' lives. As Krim
argues, "one could argue that the danger of [sexual] abuse is always
present in female prisons with male guards, even without body searches
or exposure of women inmates' bodies."3 4
1. The Place of Privacy in Prison
A fundamental problem with privacy as a basis for women prisoners'
Fourth Amendment claims to be free from intrusive and sexualized
search and surveillance is that a prisoner's claim to "privacy" may seem

is entrusted to prison officials, some of whom harass women prisoners and many of
whom tolerate the harassment. Furthermore, the women are tightly confined,
making their escape from harassment as unlikely as escape from the jail itself.
887 F. Supp. 634, 665 (D.D.C. 1994). As a result, sexual harassment has a "profound" effect
on women in prison:
The effect of sexual harassment on women prisoners is profound. The abuse has a
significant impact on a woman's concentration, and it lowers confidence and selfesteem. It leads to irritability, anxiety and nervousness. Women may be angry that
the incident is happening and fearful that they will be continually exposed to it.
Women prisoners who experience sexual harassment report significant depression,
nausea, frequent headaches, insomnia and feelings of fatigue. Those who report the
harassment often experience increased stress and may end up becoming isolated
from other women in the institution.
Women can feel self-doubt, and
disillusionment at the failure of the organization to protect them. Women prisoners
lose confidence in the system and may decide not to complain about additional
incidents.
Id. at 642-43.
312. Id. at 634 (citations omitted).

313. Id. at 665.
314. Krim, supra note 15, at 108.
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misplaced in prison."' In jail, we expect prisoners to be subject to
surveillance."' A prisoner's claim to "privacy" within the prison may
thus seem, at first glance, to be frivolous; such claims have been given
little weight by the courts when balanced against guards' claims to
equality in employment. As the district court judge put it in Everson,
"there is nothing.., to suggest that the 'privacy of prisoners, especially
female' as the term privacy is conventionally used, is a mission of the
[correctional system].
Indeed, security, not privacy, is a more
appropriate focus for a prison.""
Furthermore, the fact that prisoners are presumed to have
transgressed societal norms of conduct31 8 is purported to justify their
removal from constitutional protections. In Grummett v. Rushen,31 9 the
court distinguished the prisoner-plaintiff from the plaintiff in York on
the basis that the York plaintiff was a victim of crime.32 ° Thus, the status
of a person as prisoner is determinative in determining the existence,
scope, and content of his or her privacy rights.
315. "'[C]ommon sense' norms of gender are much more likely to seem persuasive and
important to protect in genteel settings like nursing homes or the Standard Oil building than
in settings such as prisons." Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1286.
In prison, prisoners are legally subjected to "numerous mortifying rituals, such as
searching, stripping, bathing, spraying, and the taking of personal property, that are
conducted with the institutional purpose of converting newcomers into manageable inmates."
IRWIN, supra note 180, at 68-69.

316. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528 n.39 (1984); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537
(1979) ("loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement").
317. Everson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 222 F. Supp. 2d 864, 878 (E.D. Mich. 2002); see
also Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526. In the prison privacy cases, institutional "security" is typically
contrasted with prisoners' claims to be free from abusive search or surveillance by guards. I
have not found any case in which the prison's interest in "security" was found to encompass
any obligation to protect prisoners' security of the person.
318. Although the presumption of innocence should preclude the judicial endorsement
of such assumptions about pretrial detainees, they have not been substantively accorded any
greater Fourth Amendment privacy rights than have been accorded to convicted prisoners.
319. 779 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1985).
320. Id. at 494; see also Local 567 Am. Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, AFLCIO v. Mich. Council 25, Am. Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees, 635 F. Supp 1010,
1014 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (contrasting the privacy interests of mental health patients from the
privacy interests of prisoners: "It would be a strange doctrine.., that would decree that the
sanctity of the right to privacy in the performance of excretory functions, fully respected in a
public restroom, is forfeited by... falling ill and becoming hospitalized" with "prisoners have
relinquished much of their privacy rights."). For other cases recognizing a privacy interest in
not being seen by the opposite sex that outweighed the equal employment interests of
employees, see, e.g., EEOC v. Mercy Health Center, 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 159, 163
(W.D. Okla. 1982) (employment of male nurses in labor and delivery area), Backus v. Baptist
Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981) (same), and Norwood v. Dale
Maintenance System, 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill.
1984) (public restroom attendant).
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The courts have also adopted a punitive rationale for refusing to
recognize prisoners' claims to privacy. In Hudson, Chief Justice Burger
held:
Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of
persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for anti-social
criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have necessarily
shown a lapse in ability to control and conform their behavior to
the legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses of selfrestraint; they have shown an inability to regulate their conduct
in a way that reflects either a respect for law or an appreciation
of the rights of others. 21
The implication is that, whether they are detained before trial or
incarcerated after conviction, prisoners have forfeited their
constitutional rights.
If freedom from fear of sexual assault were recognized as part of a
cognizable constitutional right to human dignity protected by the Fourth
Amendment,322 a female prisoner's claim to a right not to have her
breasts or genitals be touched by men, and that male guards not see her
naked, would
be recognized as more than gendered "decency" or
"modesty. 3 23 Modesty and decency are claims that courts may find illsuited to prisoners, given the stereotypes of black women and prisoners
as prostitutes or sexual deviants, and given prisoners' failure in general
to conform to ideals of white, middle-class feminine gentility. A right to
be free from the fear of sexual assault would likely be accorded greater
weight by courts.
In practice, guards can and do search the bodies and cells of
prisoners, at any time, for any or no reason. Often, the searches are
abusive. 324 For prisoners, the lack of privacy in prison is severe,
disorienting, and dehumanizing, even when the guards do not present a
sexual threat. Jean Harris, a prisoner at Bedford Hills Correctional
Facility, observes that any guard "could walk into my cell as I sit here
and tear up the pictures of my sons and the manuscript I am writing and
anything else that strikes their fancy, and they can do so with the

321.
322.
323.
324.

Hudson, 468 U.S. at 526.
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
Jurado, supra note 29, at 42; Miller, Government's Hands, supra note 3, at 868.
See, e.g., HARRIS, supra note 16, at 236-37; IRWIN, supra note 180, at 68-69;
JOHNSON, supra note 180, at 193.
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32 5
approval of the United States Supreme Court.
One prisoner wrote to Kathryn Watterson Burkhart:

At shower time.., they have a room where its something like a
supply room, about 8 feet by 10 feet. As many as can goes into
this room and undress, for your shower. Then you walk across
the hall NUDE and there is another room about the same
size.... There are as many women as can squeeze in this area.
About 15 women crowd into this space, because the nurse wants
them to hurry up and get through with their showers so that the
nurse can sit back down. The nurses all of them do the same
thing. They sit on a stool in the hall in front of the shower room
and yells, to different patients that are standing under the water
too long, "Alright, Sally, Mary, etc. get away from that shower so
someone else can use some water. Move over, so Mary can get
wet." When you get soaped up, you are then allowed to get
under the shower and rinse off. The nurse sitting on the stool
holds a can of Right Guard, and you hold your arms up and she
sprays them for you. Then the nurse puts some lotion in your
hand, to lotion with.326
Such intrusive supervision, of course, is degrading and dehumanizing
to all prisoners. To allow a man to perform such functions for women
who have been abused and are afraid of men, though, would introduce a
profound level of fear and psychological trauma, and a risk of sexual
abuse, that the courts should not condone.
2. "Sexual Profiling": Not All Men Will Sexually Abuse Women
As Kapczynski observes, the current law of privacy "circumscrib[es]
a zone where gender, sexuality, and notions of physical and psychic
safety overlap. 3 27
Employers justify discriminatory employment
practices by attributing racist, sexist, class-based fears and prejudices to
their customers, and call those prejudices privacy. "How could it be,"
Kapczynski asks, "that women would have a constitutional right to a
same-sex nurse but men would not, or that women would have a

325. HARRIS, supra note 16, at 238; see also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. at 550 (holding
that even property searches that "serve[ ] no purpose but harassment" engage no privacy
"interest that society considers reasonable," and thus do not engage the Fourth Amendment).
326. WAT-rERSON, supra note 81, at 67.

327. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1274.
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32
constitutional right to a same-sex nurse but not to a same-sex doctor?""
Privacy as protection against abuse offers an answer to Kapczynski's
question: There is no such right, unless the privacy-claiming litigant
proves that male nurses are somehow more dangerous than male
physicians (an assertion that, as Kapczynski suggests, almost certainly

reflects gender and class prejudice). Litigants must prove that the fears
they attribute to their clients (or prisoners) are based on a real,
heightened risk of sexual abuse, or trauma from the treatment per se;

they cannot rely on discriminatory conjecture.
As Kapczynski, Jurado, and Miller point out, "not all men would

abuse inmates; only some might."329 When the constitutional issues are
framed from guards' perspective, it will seem patently false that all male
employees are unable to perform the duties of the job.3" Jurado, for
example, argues that it is a conceptual "leap" from the fact that
custodial sexual abuse is overwhelmingly committed by men guards on

women prisoners to the conclusion that "only female officers can
successfully perform their responsibilities.,

331

Viewed from the guard's

perspective, this argument seems compelling.

328. Id. at 1271.
329. Id. at 1281 (emphasis omitted); see also Jurado, supra note 29, at 52; Miller,
Government's Hands,supra note 3, at 871.
330. Gender is a BFOQ "only when the employer can show that the excluded class is
unable to perform the duties that constitute the essence of the job, duties that Title VII
defines as 'necessary to the normal operation of the particular business or enterprise."'
Hayes v. Shelby Mem'l Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1984). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive.., or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2(e) provides for a BFOQ exception:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees.., on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business enterprise.
Id.
331. Jurado, supranote 29, at 52.
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However, when the constitutional issues are framed from the
perspective of the prisoner's privacy and bodily integrity, the analysis
changes. The risk to a prisoner's sexual integrity is posed almost
exclusively by men. The prisoner who is subject to cross-gender search
and surveillance has no way to tell which of the men is likely to sexually
abuse her. In light of her likely history of physical and sexual abuse by
men, she is likely to fear sexual abuse from all of them.
Courts are understandably reluctant to treat all male guards as
potential sexual abusers. Many courts have had difficulty finding a
gender BFOQ for guards in women's prisons because not all male
guards will sexually assault women inmates. For example, in Everson,
Judge Cohn found:
There has simply been no showing that there is reasonable cause
to find that all, or substantially all, males are not able to perform
safely and efficiently the duties of a CO and RUO in the housing
units in the female prisons. Very few male CO or RUO's are
likely to be involved in improper activities. The few that are
likely to be involved does [sic] not justify a BFOQ requirement
in the face of federal and state law clearly prohibiting gender
based discrimination.332
Thus even where, as in Everson, the uncontroverted evidence was
that prisoners were continuing to allege incidents of sexual abuse,
women's right to be free from sexual abuse was subordinate to the equal
employment interests of male guards. Guards had a right to be
presumed not to be sexual abusers even where the evidence was that
many (not "very few") male guards had been sexually abusing female
inmates for years.
Courts have proved reluctant to brand all men as potential sexual
abusers. This reticence leads them to reject most prisoners' privacy
claims that male guards should be excluded from women's housing
units.333 When the courts have upheld women-only guard policies, it has
been on the basis of the women's pre-existing psychological
vulnerability, not the guards' sexual aggression."
Judicial resistance to acknowledging the threat posed by male guards-

332.
333.
334.
1521 (9th

222 F. Supp. 2d 864, 994-95 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
See, e.g., id. at 864; Edwards v. Dep't of Corr., 615 F. Supp. 804 (M.D. Ala. 1985).
See Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1998); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d
Cir. 1992); Torres v. Wisconsin, 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988).
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reflects what Fenton describes as the "fiction that violence is
'
exceptional."335

"Violence," she points out, is constructed as "the

domain of the other," and is "antithetical to the way in which we
'
imagine ourselves behaving."336
Thus, in Dothard, the Supreme Court
presumed an undifferentiated risk that male prisoners (who are assumed
to be deviant) would sexually assault female guards, and sacrificed the
guards' employment interests to protect them against

it.

33 7

The

institutional status of guards, on the other hand, insulates them from
being labeled violent, even when they are.338
It is almost impossible for a prisoner to demonstrate that a particular

male guard poses a risk of sexual abuse. Custodial sexual abuse is likely
to be even more severely underreported than is sexual abuse or assault
outside the prison: 39 "[d]ue to the threat of retaliation by guards,

women are fearful to report incidents of sexual abuse." 30 Because of the
underreporting of sexual abuse, "a guard might pose a high assault risk
335. Fenton, supra note 24, at 1035.
336. Id. at 1027.
337. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
338. Fenton, supra note 24, at 1028-29 ("We are resistant to discussing actions of the
police as violent because we view the police as institutionally legitimate. This is particularly
the case when such acts are committed against those belonging to groups who are stereotyped
as violent.).
339. Violence in prison is substantially underreported, either because prisoners are
intimidated or because prison staff are indifferent to or discourage reports by prisoners.
Laderberg, supra note 15, at 360. Furthermore, prisoner grievances are often leaked to prison
staff, and prisoners often face retaliation for reporting their abuse. Human Rights Watch,
Nowhere to Hide, supra note 3; Amnesty International, Not Partof My Sentence, supra note 1.
They also enjoy no prospect of escape from their abusers. Dinos, supra note 49, at 293.
Finally, the usual factors that deter women from reporting abuse on the outside are
redoubled in prison: shame; fear of disclosure; fear of retaliation; concern that they will not be
believed; skepticism by investigators and courts toward allegations of sexual offences; a belief,
instilled by the perpetrator's behavior, that complaint is useless; and the victim's desire to
assert "control" over the situation by containing their emotions and remaining silent. DIANA
MAJURY, THE TiP OF THE DISCRIMINATION ICEBERG: BARRIERS TO DISCLOSURE OF THE
ABUSE AND MISTREATMENT OF FEDERALLY SENTENCED WOMEN: A SUBMISSION BY THE
WOMEN'S LEGAL EDUCATION AND ACTION FUND (LEAF) TO THE CANADIAN HUMAN
RIGHTS COMMISSION IN RELATION TO THEIR SPECIAL REPORT ADDRESSING THE
TREATMENT OF WOMEN SERVING FEDERAL TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT 7 (May 2003)

[unpublished brief to Canadian Human Rights Commission], at http://www.elizabethfry.ca
/submissn/leaf/leaf.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2005).
Moreover, prison records "have been found to be too self-serving to meet the reliability
requirements of the public records and reports rule." Id. (citing John Boston et al., Farmer v.
Brennan: Defining Deliberate Indifference Under the Eighth Amendment, 14 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 83, 104 (1994)). The problems of underreporting are exacerbated when the
violence prisoners suffer is sexual. Laderberg, supra note 15.
340. Dinos, supranote 49, at 293.
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yet still not have a record." 31 Moreover, "departments of corrections
often fail to record complaints or even to investigate them in an
organized and centralized manner." 2
Indeed, the "deliberate
indifference" standard imposed for Eighth Amendment liability creates
a legal incentive for prisons to discourage, dismiss, or fail 43to
3 record
prisoners' complaints of sexual abuse (or other mistreatment).
Fenton's insight into the ordinary (as opposed to exceptional) nature
of violence helps to resolve what Elizabeth Schneider challenges as the
"false dichotomy"
between women's "victimization" and women's
"agency" ' illustrated by the tension between the approaches of the
modesty critics, on one hand, and of Weiser, Laderberg, and Dinos, on
the other. As Fenton points out, the fictional notion that violence is
exceptional "is fundamental to stereotypes that portray battered women
as helpless, dependent, and pathological. If it were understood that
violence is really everywhere, then it would not be difficult to accept
that violence happens to ordinary women" 34 5-often at the hands of
ordinary men, including guards.
3. Equal Protection of Men and Women
As Kapczynski contends, privacy as modesty "can only successfully
defend individuals from a particular kind of assault and harassmentthe kind that happens in scenes of genital exposure between different
sexes."' Sexual abuse, of course, can occur in areas where prisoners are
not naked, and guards can abuse prisoners of the same gender as
themselves."7
In prison, privacy claims should be assessed on the basis of whether
the impugned search or surveillance gives rise to a realistic fear of sexual
abuse. This shift, I propose, can help to address the "symmetry"
341. Id.
342. Laderberg, supra note 15, at 323.
343. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). If an assaulted prisoner brings an
Eighth Amendment claim in respect of sexual abuse committed against her by a guard, courts
will not find that the prison has been "deliberately indifferent" to the risk of sexual assault
upon her unless the prison has received and recorded previous reports of sexual abuse by the
same perpetrator. Id.; see Barney v. Pulsipher,143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998); Scott v. Moore,
114 F.3d 51 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, as long as a male guard has not been identified as a likely
abuser, the prison is likely to be immune from liability for sexual assaults he may commit.
344. Elizabeth Schneider, Feminism and the False Dichotomy of Victimization and
Agency, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. REV. 387 (1993).

345. Fenton, supra note 24, at 1035.
346. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1290.
347. Id. at 1290; Miller, Sex Surveillance,supra note 28, at 309.
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argument that there is something unfair in treating female guards'
search and surveillance of male prisoners differently from male guards'
search and surveillance of women prisoners.348 However, as Miller
points out,
far more guard-on-prisoner sexual violence is thought to occur
between male guards and prisoners in women's prisons than in
men's prisons. On the other hand, far more prisoner-on-prisoner
sexual violence is believed to occur in men's prisons. Judicial
insistence upon formal symmetry fails to recognize that men and
women experience unwanted intimate physical contact and
nudity before members of the opposite sex differently! "9
The symmetry argument leads the modesty critics to a notion of
gender "equality" between prisoners that would clearly subject women
prisoners to a heightened risk of sexual assault.5
For example, as
Karoline Jackson points out, the majority decision in Johnson v.
Phelan... to allow female guards to view male prisoners in the 35shower
"is
2
not surprising in that it works to deny relief to male inmates.
[I]ts implications are shocking if this line of reasoning continues
into the future. It would appear that at least in the Seventh
Circuit, allowing male guards to observe female inmates
showering and performing bodily functions would also be
constitutionally reasonable. Given the Seventh Circuit's denial
of all privacy rights to inmates, it would also be reasonable to
allow male guards to conduct body-cavity searches on female
inmates.353
If privacy is reconceptualized to incorporate freedom from fear of
sexual abuse, it can avoid the notion that the zone of privacy afforded to
male and female prisoners must be identical. Rather, both male and
348. See, e.g., Timm v. Gunter, 917 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J.,

dissenting). This argument is discussed in Miller, Sex Surveillance, supra note 28, at 336-38.
349. Miller, Sex Surveillance, supra note 28, at 337.
350. This, of course, would be, and is, the consequence of the status quo, cross-gender
staffing in men's and women's prisons-an arrangement which the modesty critics seek to
maintain.
351. 69 F.3d 144 (7th Cir. 1995)
352. Karoline E. Jackson, The Legitimacy of Cross-GenderSearches and Surveillance in
Prisons:Defining an Appropriate and Uniform Review, 73 IND. L.J. 959, 975-74 (1998).
353. Id.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[88:751

female prisoners must be protected against the well-founded fear of
sexual abuse, through whatever safeguards are appropriate and
effective. This avoids establishing either male or female prisoners as a
baseline which establishes the scope of the privacy protection afforded
to the other gender."' Rather, the question that Fourth Amendment
privacy would raise is whether the officially sanctioned search and
surveillance heightens prisoners' vulnerability to sexual assault by
guards of any gender.
If cross-gender surveillance gives rise to fear of sexual abuse in a
prison, whether the prisoners are men or women, they should be
protected from it. However, the context of cross-gender surveillance
gives rise to distinct fears in men's and women's prisons. If a litigant
seeks to challenge physical searches of women by male guards, she or it
might adduce evidence that such searches increase the risk of sexual
abuse and are likely to be traumatic in themselves because of the fear
they engender. If the litigant seeks to challenge physical searches of
men by female guards, the litigant would have to address the same
issues-heightened risk of sexual abuse, or, alternatively, direct trauma
from the searches themselves. In all likelihood, the evidence in each
case would be different and might lead to differing outcomes.
The reconceptualization of privacy I propose helps distinguish the
legitimate claims of male or female prisoners who seek to be freed from
the threat of sexual abuse from those of men who, like those described
by Miller, simply resent female guards' search powers because women's
authority over them challenges their identity and privilege as "real men"
3 '
in a "culture where manliness is highly prized.""
Miller suggests that being searched by a female guard could result in
the gender demotion of a "real man" to "punk" status, increasing the
likelihood that the man might be sexually abused by other prisoners or
guards. Under a regime of privacy as protection from sexual abuse, a
male prisoner challenging such cross-gender searches would have to
establish that cross-gender searches really do result in such demotion,
and that the risk of consequent sexual assault was greater if it is women
guards who perform the searches, rather than men. Given that it is male
guards and not women who are sexually abusing male prisoners, and
that the presence of female guards probably makes men's prisons
354. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT, supra note 176, at 144. ("[T]he most striking
yet the most concealed flaw of discrimination doctrine [is that] in the guise of setting a single
standard for persons, women are measured by the standards of men.").
355. Miller, Sex Surveillance,supra note 28, at 309.
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somewhat safer from sexual abuse,"6 it is unlikely that such a claim
would succeed.
Moreover, since the hierarchy of "real men" over "punks" or "fags"
is in large part established by the ability of real men to rape and the
vulnerability of punks and fags to be raped, real men's claim to
continued sexual privilege is, to say the least, not an interest the
Constitution should protect.357 Moreover, recognition of male prisoners'
interest in avoiding gender demotion cannot amount to a cognizable
Fourth Amendment interest because such an interest would exclude the
"real men's" victims, the "punks" and "queens," from constitutional
protection: they are not masculine enough to be demoted.358
Miller and Kapczynski critique the "heterosexual presumption that
sex between guards and prisoners always involves individuals of two
different sexes,, 3 9 arguing that "[s]ame-sex sexual privacy doctrine
participates in the closeting of homosexuality because it presumes
everyone to experience their gender, their sexuality, and their bodies in
the same way, the 'right' way. '' 360 As they point out, same-sex sexual
abuse, perpetrated by both prisoners and guards, is a severe problem in

356. Miller acknowledges that the presence of female guards notes that excluding female
guards from male prisoners' shower and toilet areas "would likely make these areas more
dangerous than they already are." Id. at 299. It is interesting that, while criticizing the
"gender bias that power in sexual relationships is exercised by men (dominant) upon women
(vulnerable)." Id. at 309. Miller does not cite any authority for the proposition that all-male
showers would be more dangerous than showers supervised by women.
357. In Kapczynski's analysis, this interest would qualify as a mere discriminatory
"customer preference" that is contrary to the purpose of Title VII and does not merit legal
recognition as a privacy interest in the counterbalance. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1261;
see generally Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airlines, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). Kapczynski
observes that courts offer two interrelated justifications for the privacy exception to Title VII:
First, courts insist that same-sex privacy norms are so deeply held and so
fundamental to our sense of identity that they are legitimately cast beyond the reach
of antidiscrimination law. Second, courts imply that same-sex privacy norms should
be respected because they are necessary for the physical and psychological
protection of individuals.
Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1261. The former justification accurately characterizes male
prisoners' aversion to being searched by female guards on the basis that it compromises their
masculinity, and, as Kapczynski contends, is unworthy of legal recognition.
358. This is consistent with Miller's assertion that disempowerment is more harmful to
men than to women because, lacking gender privilege, women have nothing to lose, discussed
supra note 206 and accompanying text.
359. Miller, Sex Surveillance,supra note 28, at 309; see also Kapczynski, supra note 26, at
1293.
360. Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 1287.
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men's prisons. 361' Given, however, that same-sex sexual abuse is not
reported to be a major problem in women's prisons, this is not an
argument in favor of gender-neutral privacy. Rather, an assessment of
the risk of sexual abuse must take into account that the perpetrators of
custodial sexual abuse in men's and women's prisons are
overwhelmingly men.
At the same time, if a particular form of search or surveillance
increases the risk of sexual abuse regardless of whether the guards are
men or women, it would still raise a cognizable Fourth Amendment
claim, but the remedy, obviously, would be one that did not target
guards of a particular gender. Thus, this privacy as protection against
the risk and fear of sexual abuse does not "foreclose[ ] the possibility of
limiting cross-gender searches on the basis of intra-gender sexual
abuse, 36 2 as Miller contends other gender-conscious remedies do.
Thus, a reconceptualization of privacy as a right to be free from the
fear of sexual abuse would enable Fourth Amendment privacy to
protect prisoners against abuse beyond the narrow context of crossgender surveillance of unclothed women prisoners.
IV. CONCLUSION

Thus far, the Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine has offered
virtually no protection to prisoners seeking protection against custodial
sexual abuse. The scope of prisoners' constitutional privacy rights is
entirely limited by the interests of guards and prisons.
Fourth
Amendment privacy jurisprudence has served better to immunize
prisons from liability than to protect any dignitary or privacy interests of
prisoners.
Furthermore, as the modesty critics point out, the content of existing
privacy law is little more than a conception of feminine modesty that
depends for its currency on discriminatory notions of gender, race, and
class. As a result, privacy has failed to protect prisoners against the risk
and reality of sexual abuse.
In this Article, I have presented an alternative interpretation of
prisoners' Fourth Amendment privacy that confronts the underlying
concern about sexual abuse in privacy doctrine by putting it at the
center of the privacy analysis. The interest protected by Fourth
Amendment privacy must be reconceptualized: it is not a gendered

361. Id. at 1291 n.154; Miller, Sex Surveillance,supra note 28, at 300-08.
362. Miller, Sex Surveillance, supranote 28, at 300-08.
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notion of modesty or decency, but a constitutional right to be free of the
state-imposed risk, fear, and reality of sexual abuse in prison.
Thus, in addressing claims of privacy in prison, the courts should
take a gender-conscious, contextual approach to the evidentiary inquiry
to answer two questions: (1) Does the impugned search or surveillance
increase the risk of sexual abuse? or (2) Does the impugned practice
itself traumatize prisoners because of the fear of sexual abuse that it
engenders?
By adopting this approach, the courts may transcend the gender,
race, and class biases that have informed the failure of the Fourth
Amendment to protect prisoners against custodial sexual abuse.
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